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27 
Article  
A Corporate Right to Privacy 
Elizabeth Pollman† 
Do corporations have a constitutional right to privacy? 
Could a corporation claim a constitutional right to the nondis-
closure of its information, as AT&T might have argued in its 
recent Freedom of Information Act case? Might a corporation 
have a privacy claim if the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion required it to disclose health information about its CEO, as 
Apple resisted disclosing information about Steve Jobs’s declin-
ing health? Does the ACLU have a right to privacy that is vio-
lated by the government’s mass collection and surveillance of 
its phone call metadata? Should corporations have such a right 
to privacy? 
The Supreme Court has never squarely answered the cor-
porate right to privacy question. A 1950 case, United States v. 
Morton Salt Co., has been cited for the proposition that corpo-
rations have no constitutional right to privacy, but that was not 
the holding of the case, which notably predated the Court’s dec-
laration of a constitutional right to privacy.1 More recently in 
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FCC v. AT&T, in which AT&T claimed a “personal privacy” ex-
emption under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to shield 
its documents from public disclosure, the Court decided the 
case as a matter of statutory interpretation, specifically noting 
that the corporation had made no constitutional privacy 
claims.2 Other federal and state courts have diverged on the is-
sue of a corporate constitutional right to privacy—some courts 
have rejected claims in opinions with little or flawed reasoning, 
and some have recognized a limited corporate right to privacy 
under the Federal Constitution in contexts like discovery and 
subpoenas, but have left the contours of the corporate right un-
defined.3  
This Article explores this question and attempts to provide 
a principled approach for answering it. Scholars have mined 
the depths of other topics such as whether corporations should 
have privacy rights at common law,4 whether trade secret law 
resembles common law privacy torts,5 and, most relatedly, 
whether corporations should have Fourth Amendment protec-
tions.6 Others have conducted an economic analysis of privacy.7 
And scholars have examined privacy concerns, constitutional 
and otherwise, in various specific contexts such as litigation 
 
 1. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950) (establishing 
the standard under the Fourth Amendment for judicial enforcement of admin-
istrative subpoenas); see infra Part I.A. 
 2. FCC v. AT&T, 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1184 (2011). The case turned on the 
meaning of the word “personal” for purposes of the FOIA “personal privacy” 
exemption. The Court concluded that corporations may not claim the FOIA 
personal privacy exemption because although the statute defines “person” to 
include corporations, adjectives like “personal” do not necessarily reflect the 
ordinary meaning of their corresponding nouns and the context of the statute 
does not support a reading that would include corporations. Id. at 1181–85. 
 3. See infra Part I.B. 
 4. Anita L. Allen, Rethinking the Rule Against Corporate Privacy Rights: 
Some Conceptual Quandaries for the Common Law, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 
607 (1987). 
 5. KIM LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS 231–47, 253–56 (1988). 
 6. See, e.g., William C. Heffernan, Fourth Amendment Privacy Interests, 
92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 76–80 (2002); Christopher Slobogin, Citizens 
United & Corporate & Human Crime, 14 GREEN BAG 2d 77, 83–84 (2010); 
Christopher Slobogin, Subpoenas and Privacy, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 805, 814–19 
(2005) [hereinafter Slobogin, Subpoenas]. 
 7. E.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 231–47 (1981); 
Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic De-
fense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381 (1996); Richard A. Posner, The Right of 
Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393 (1978). 
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discovery,8 subpoenas,9 bank secrecy,10 and FOIA exemptions, 
including the recent FCC v. AT&T case concerning the “per-
sonal privacy” exemption.11 Yet scholars have all but overlooked 
whether a corporate constitutional right to privacy exists as 
such.12  
 
 8. Jordana Cooper, Beyond Judicial Discretion: Toward a Rights-Based 
Theory of Civil Discovery and Protective Orders, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 775, 779–81, 
810–13 (2005); Elizabeth A. Rowe, Trade Secret Litigation and Free Speech: Is 
It Time To Restrain the Plaintiffs?, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1425, 1426 (2009); see also 
Ronald J. Allen & Cynthia M. Hazelwood, Preserving the Confidentiality of In-
ternal Corporate Investigations, 12 J. CORP. L. 355, 357 (1987). See generally 
JEROME G. SNIDER ET AL., CORPORATE PRIVILEGES AND CONFIDENTIAL IN-
FORMATION (2014) (describing the application of privacy case law to corporate 
litigation). 
 9. See, e.g., Slobogin, Subpoenas, supra note 6, at 809–10; Abraham 
Tabaie, Note, Protecting Privacy Expectations and Personal Documents in SEC 
Investigations, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 781, 815 (2008). 
 10. See, e.g., Bradley J. Bondi, Don’t Tread on Me: Has the United States 
Government’s Quest for Customer Records from UBS Sounded the Death Knell 
for Swiss Bank Secrecy Laws?, 30 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 1, 3–7 (2010); 
Laura Szarmach, Note, Piercing the Veil of Bank Secrecy? Assessing the United 
States’ Settlement in the UBS Case, 43 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 409, 431 (2010). 
 11. See Daniel Greenwood, FCC v. AT&T: The Idolatry of Corporations 
and Impersonal Privacy (Hofstra Univ. Legal Research Paper Series, Research 
Paper No. 11-16, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1884965; Scott A. Hartman, Comment, Privacy, Personhood, and 
the Courts: FOIA Exemption 7(C) in Context, 120 YALE L.J. 379 (2010); Maeve 
E. Huggins, Comment, Don’t Take It Personally: Supreme Court Finds Corpo-
rations Lack Personal Privacy Under FOIA Exemptions, 19 COMMLAW CON-
SPECTUS 481 (2011); Kathleen Vermazen Radez, Survey, The Freedom of In-
formation Act Exemption 4: Protecting Corporate Reputation in the Post-Crash 
Regulatory Environment, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 632, 650–51, 663 (2010). 
Commentators on the recent AT&T case asserted with little explanation that 
corporations have no, and ought to have no, right to privacy. E.g., Dahlia 
Lithwick, Privacy Rights Inc., SLATE (Oct. 14, 2010, 6:42 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/id/2270956/; Nell Minow, Supreme Court to Consider 
Corporate “Privacy” Rights, DAILY VIEWPOINT (Nov. 18, 2010), http:// 
www3.gmiratings.com/home/2010/11/supreme-court-to-consider-corporate 
-privacy-rights/; Alan B. Morrison, Privacy for People, Not Corporations, PO-
LITICO (Dec. 30, 2010, 4:31 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1210/ 
46901.html. 
 12. There is a very small literature examining this question and it is lim-
ited in approach. See EDWARD J. BLOUSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL & GROUP PRIVACY 
140–46 (2d prtg. 2004), discussed infra Part III.A; RUSSELL B. STEVENSON, 
JR., CORPORATIONS AND INFORMATION: SECRECY, ACCESS, AND DISCLOSURE 6, 
69–75 (1980) (discussing corporate interest in preserving the security of in-
formation and arguing that a corporate right to privacy is “on its face an ab-
surdity” because privacy involves human values that a corporation cannot 
claim); William C. Lindsay, Comment, When Uncle Sam Calls Does Ma Bell 
Have To Answer?: Recognizing a Constitutional Right to Corporate Informa-
tional Privacy, 18 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 915 (1985) (arguing that corporations 
should have a constitutional right to informational privacy under Whalen v. 
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The question of whether corporations have, or should have, 
a constitutional right to privacy merits more consideration. 
Privacy can facilitate both socially beneficial and harmful activ-
ity.13 Businesses would be impaired without some ability to con-
trol access to their information and affairs.14 Trade secret, cor-
porate privileges, and other statutory and common law 
protections may fill this need, though, and constitutional priva-
cy interests may not be implicated in these business circum-
stances.15 Some corporations are not large businesses, however; 
they may be formed by small groups of individuals associating 
to pursue social, political, or religious goals. The corporation 
may be better positioned or the only effective actor to vindicate 
the privacy interests of these individuals acting in association. 
Further, the freedom to associate, a right that is understood to 
extend to groups including corporations, is linked to the concept 
of privacy.16 In NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, in which 
the Supreme Court held that state-compelled disclosure of the 
civil rights group’s membership list was invalid as restraining 
the members’ freedom of association, the Court recognized “the 
vital relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in 
one’s associations.”17 Constitutional rights are interdependent 
with and constrain government power.18 Thus, there are rea-
 
Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977)). Stevenson asserts that “[c]orporations can no more 
be injured by an invasion of their ‘privacy’ than they can swear, scratch, make 
love, or engage in any of the other flesh-and-blood activities that the walls of 
privacy serve to protect from unwanted observation.” STEVENSON, supra, at 
69.  
 13. ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SO-
CIETY 40 (1998) (“Privacy can be used for good or ill, to help or to harm.”); 
DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 99 (2008) (“Privacy facilitates 
many activities, from the worthy to the wicked.”). 
 14. See, e.g., Privacy and the Rights of Federal Employees: Hearing on S. 
3779 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 89th Cong. 818 (1967) (“If all written memos and policy discussions 
were subject to immediate publication, or if private organizations knew they 
were under continuous monitoring by government agents, much of the debate 
would automatically become formalized. . . . [G]radual accommodation of di-
vergent views within the organization would be hampered.”). 
 15. See SCHEPPELE, supra note 5, at 231–47. 
 16. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Individual Rights and the Powers of Govern-
ment, 27 GA. L. REV. 343, 343–45 (1993); see also Richard H. Pildes, Why 
Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitu-
tionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725, 725 (1998) (“Most often, rights police the 
kinds of justifications government can act on in different spheres rather than 
protecting atomistic interests in autonomy, or liberty, or dignity. Rights there-
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sons to believe a constitutional right to privacy may be an im-
portant check against government power for individuals who 
act together through the corporate form, but that according 
such a right to all corporations would be unfounded and could 
powerfully shield them from investigation or regulation.19  
Any extension of the right to corporations indeed requires 
particularly careful analysis as the Federal Constitution in-
cludes no express reference to a right to privacy and it is one of 
the least defined rights in the law.20 Courts have found roots for 
privacy in a variety of provisions and their “penumbras.”21 In 
Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court’s first recognition 
of an independent right to privacy, the Court famously located 
the right in “zones of privacy” emanating from the First, Third, 
Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments.22 Since then, the Court 
has expanded this line of cases concerning autonomy in making 
certain important decisions by relying on the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Due Process 
 
fore serve as tools courts use to evaluate the social meanings and expressive 
dimensions of governmental action.”); cf. RONALD DWORKIN, Rights as 
Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 153–67 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984) (charac-
terizing rights as “trumps” that protect individual interests against collective 
goals or majoritarian preferences); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERI-
OUSLY 184–205 (1977) (same); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 36 
(1980) (conceiving of rights as “trumps” that “can cut across or ‘trump’ pow-
ers”). For a discussion of what it means for a right to have constitutional sta-
tus, see Richard Primus, Unbundling Constitutionality, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1079, 1087 (2013) (“[T]he attributes of constitutionality behave more like 
sticks in a bundle than like a set of necessary bases and the payoffs that follow 
. . . .”). 
 19. This Article uses the term “rights” as understood in popular usage; a 
right privileges or protects the interest or claim of the right holder, but is not 
absolute because in a particular instance a rival interest could prevail. See 
Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of Private Governments, 78 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 144, 154 (2003). 
 20. See RICHARD CLAYTON & HUGH TOMLINSON, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 
OF EXPRESSION 1 (2010). Privacy law is a patchwork of legal sources: the Con-
stitution, state constitutions, federal and state statutes, and common law. See 
generally ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 330–64 (1967) (discussing 
various historical developments in U.S. privacy law). Depending on the cir-
cumstances, different legal doctrines may govern the resolution of a claimed 
privacy right. This Article concerns a right of privacy under the Federal Con-
stitution. 
 21. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483–84 (1965). See generally 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1308–12 (2d ed. 1988) 
(discussing the sources of protected rights of “personhood”); WESTIN, supra 
note 20, at 349–56 (describing Griswold in the context of a historical review of 
American privacy law). 
 22. 381 U.S. at 484. 
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Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.23 The Court 
has also raised the possibility of a separate privacy interest 
premised on nondisclosure of information that stems from the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.24 
This Article argues that most corporations in most circum-
stances should not have a constitutional right to privacy. There 
is simply no natural person, or persons, associated in a corpora-
tion with a privacy interest at stake and a need for the corpora-
tion to vindicate it. Yet because corporations are not monolith-
ic, but rather exist along a spectrum, this Article also 
highlights that some nonprofit and private corporations could 
present a stronger claim in limited circumstances given their 
varying purposes and dynamics, particularly in social, political, 
and religious realms.25 
The Article develops this analysis in three parts. Part I 
shows it is an open question in Supreme Court jurisprudence 
whether corporations have a constitutional right to privacy and 
provides the first scholarly treatment of the growing body of 
conflicting law in the lower courts on this unresolved issue. 
Part II examines corporate rights jurisprudence, showing that 
the Court has not developed a coherent method or test for these 
determinations, but has often relied on a view of the corpora-
tion as an association in extending rights to corporations on a 
derivative basis. Building on the underlying framework of the 
jurisprudence, and the closest articulations of a test the Court 
has made, this Article asserts that in determining whether to 
accord a right to a corporation, we should look to whether the 
purpose of the right is served by according it to the corporation 
in question—that is, whether it is necessary in order to protect 
natural persons—and whether the right is of a type that 
inheres only in an individual in his or her individual capacity. 
 
 23. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564–76 (2003) (discussing priva-
cy case law history). 
 24. See infra Part III.A. 
 25.  As this Article was in the publication process, the Supreme Court 
handed down its opinion in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 
2751 (2014), holding that federal regulations requiring employers to provide 
insurance coverage for certain forms of contraception violate the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) as applied to certain closely held 
corporations, each owned and controlled by members of a single family with 
sincerely held religious beliefs. Notably, the Court based its decision on statu-
tory grounds under RFRA rather than the First Amendment. For a critical 
discussion of the case, see Margaret Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Derivative 
Nature of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcom-
ing 2015) (on file with author). 
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Using this approach, Part III explores whether the right to pri-
vacy should extend to corporations. Specifically, the analysis 
looks to whether a corporate right to privacy would protect the 
privacy interests of the people involved, such as shareholders, 
directors, and officers, or other participants such as employees. 
This approach keeps in focus that people are the object of con-
stitutional protection; granting rights to corporations makes 
sense only as a means to protect people and carry out the pur-
pose of the right. Finally, Part III explores deeper issues raised 
by the inquiry—whether there is something specific about the 
right to privacy or the corporate form that would categorically 
foreclose all corporations from having such a right—and con-
siders what the future may hold in this area.  
I.  THE OPEN QUESTION OF CORPORATE PRIVACY   
The existing case law addressing whether corporations 
have a constitutional right to privacy is in disarray and has, to 
date, escaped scholarly attention. Above all, the existing case 
law shows that the Supreme Court has not squarely answered 
the question and that there is a small, but growing body of con-
flicting law in the lower federal courts and state courts on this 
unresolved issue. This Part examines the case law, which 
shows the growing importance of the issue and the need for a 
more coherent approach to the corporate privacy question and 
to corporate rights jurisprudence more generally.26 
 
 26. Although there is a short line of cases that use the term “commercial 
privacy” in their rationale, these cases concern trade secret or unfair competi-
tion law and do not clearly implicate a constitutional right. See Kewanee Oil 
Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 487 (1974) (“A most fundamental human 
right, that of privacy, is threatened when industrial espionage is condoned or 
is made profitable; the state interest in denying profit to such illegal ventures 
is unchallengeable.” (footnote omitted)); E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. 
Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016 (1970) (“Commercial privacy must be pro-
tected from espionage which could not have been reasonably anticipated or 
prevented.”); BLOUSTEIN, supra note 12, at 129, 145–46 (citing Kewanee Oil in 
support of a corporation’s right to protect trade secrets); M. Ryan Calo, The 
Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131, 1134 n.13 (2011) (noting that 
the invasion of “commercial privacy” in duPont might have been better de-
scribed as unfair competition); Rowe, supra note 8, at 1434–35 (noting that 
although Kewanee Oil and duPont “appear to have laid the foundation for 
commercial privacy in trade secret jurisprudence, the concept has remained 
undefined”). 
POLLMAN_4fmt 11/6/2014 3:54 PM 
34 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [99:27 
 
A. SUPREME COURT: UNITED STATES V. MORTON SALT CO.  
Morton Salt is the Supreme Court’s primary decision that, 
at least notionally, addresses whether corporations have a con-
stitutional right to privacy.27 In it, the Court stated, “corpora-
tions can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of 
a right to privacy.”28 That phrase, and the few paragraphs of 
discussion around it, has received little to no scrutiny, however, 
and later courts have relied on it to inconsistently reject and 
recognize a corporate right to privacy.29 This section explores 
the ways in which Morton Salt left open the question of wheth-
er corporations have a constitutional right to privacy. 
The case concerned whether the Federal Trade Commis-
sion could require Morton Salt, a corporation, to file reports 
showing compliance with an earlier order to stop engaging in 
certain trade practices.30 Much of the Supreme Court’s opinion 
focused on three of Morton Salt’s claims regarding jurisdiction 
and the Administrative Procedure Act; only a small sliver ad-
dressed Morton Salt’s other argument, that the order was “nov-
el and arbitrary and violate[d] the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments to the Constitution.”31 
The Court began that sliver of explanation by framing pri-
vacy, the “right to be let alone,” as only concerning Fourth 
Amendment search and seizure protections and the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.32 This narrow 
 
 27. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950). California 
Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974), is occasionally also cited in con-
nection with the concept of corporations’ constitutional privacy. E.g., Jadwin v. 
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 367 N.W.2d 476, 486 n.10 (Minn. 1985). Cali-
fornia Bankers concerned the constitutionality of the Bank Secrecy Act of 
1970, which required financial institutions to keep records of some customers 
and large transactions. Cal. Bankers, 416 U.S. at 30–41. The Court focused on 
the plaintiffs’ specific claims rather than a right to privacy as such, holding 
the First Amendment claim was premature, the Fourth Amendment claim 
failed because the regulations did not impose an unreasonable reporting re-
quirement (citing Morton Salt), and the Fifth Amendment claim failed because 
corporations have no privilege against self-incrimination and the banks did 
not have standing to assert claims on behalf of customers. Id. at 41–43, 52, 
56–57, 66–67, 71. 
 28. Morton Salt, 338 U.S. at 652. 
 29. See infra Part I.B. 
 30. Morton Salt, 338 U.S. at 634. 
 31. See id. at 638, 651–54. Morton Salt is often cited for its rule regarding 
the scope of issues that may be litigated in a subpoena enforcement proceed-
ing. See, e.g., In re McVane, 44 F.3d 1127, 1135 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 32. Morton Salt, 338 U.S. at 651–52 (citations omitted). There is a history 
of Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims in this vein. See POSNER, supra note 7, 
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view reflects the early state of privacy jurisprudence at the 
time.33 Notably, this case predated the Court’s recognition in 
Griswold v. Connecticut of an independent right to privacy 
based on a variety of Bill of Rights provisions creating a “zone 
of privacy” and the Court’s case law concerning a constitutional 
right to privacy in nondisclosure of personal information.34 
Thus, Morton Salt tells us little, if anything, about whether the 
Court would conclude that corporations have a right to privacy, 
as currently understood.  
Further, besides predating the Court’s privacy jurispru-
dence, Morton Salt also presented particularly weak circum-
stances for finding a privacy interest with the corporation’s at-
tempt to completely avoid the Commission’s valid request for 
information about its trade practices. With the Court’s narrow 
framing of privacy in place, it very quickly rejected Morton 
Salt’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims.35 The Court cited 
Oklahoma Press, in which it had ruled in similar circumstances 
that no actual search or seizure occurred where the Commis-
sion properly subpoenaed corporate records pursuant to a valid 
statute.36 Like Morton Salt, the corporations there had not ob-
jected to a specific defect in the breadth or terms of the request 
for corporate records, and so the Court rejected their claims as 
effectively seeking total immunity from the statute.37 The Court 
also cited Hale v. Henkel, which established that corporations 
cannot claim a Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, and that corporations are not beyond the reach 
of congressional and judicial power.38  
 
at 311 (“Long before the tort right of privacy came before the Supreme Court, 
and even before Warren and Brandeis wrote their famous article on privacy, 
the Court was confronted with claims to the protection of privacy under the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments.”). 
 33. See infra Part III.A for a discussion of Supreme Court privacy juris-
prudence. See also Daniel B. Yeager, Search, Seizure, and the Positive Law: 
Expectations of Privacy Outside the Fourth Amendment, 84 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 249, 277–78 (1993) (“In the 1940s and ’50s, the Court spoke of-
ten of the Fourth Amendment’s protection of a right of privacy.”). 
 34. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). See infra Part III.A 
for a discussion of Supreme Court privacy jurisprudence.  
 35. Morton Salt, 338 U.S. at 651–54. 
 36. Id. at 651–52 (citing Okla. Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 
(1946)). 
 37. Okla. Press, 327 U.S. at 195–96; see Morton Salt, 338 U.S. at 653–54.  
 38. Morton Salt, 338 U.S. at 651–52 (citing Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 
70 (1906)); see also Okla. Press, 327 U.S. at 196 (“Petitioners’ plea that the 
Fourth Amendment places them so far above the law that they are beyond the 
reach of congressional and judicial power as those powers have been exerted 
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The subsequent paragraph of the opinion, following the 
Court’s compact rejection of Morton Salt’s claims, is home to 
the Court’s oft-quoted statement that “corporations can claim 
no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to pri-
vacy”: 
  While they may and should have protection from unlawful de-
mands made in the name of public investigation, corporations can 
claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to pri-
vacy. They are endowed with public attributes. They have a collective 
impact upon society, from which they derive the privilege of acting as 
artificial entities. The Federal Government allows them the privilege 
of engaging in interstate commerce. Favors from government often 
carry with them an enhanced measure of regulation. Even if one were 
to regard the request for information in this case as caused by noth-
ing more than official curiosity, nevertheless law-enforcing agencies 
have a legitimate right to satisfy themselves that corporate behavior 
is consistent with the law and the public interest.39 
Taken out of context the “no equality” phrase has been wrongly 
understood as establishing that corporations have no right to 
privacy.40 The plain language of the phrase does not establish 
such a proposition; it says only that such a right is not equal to 
that of individuals. In addition, the above paragraph shows 
that before the “no equality” phrase, the Court recognized that 
there are some limits to the government’s access to corporate 
information in investigations.41 Thus, the language, textual 
 
here only raises the ghost of controversy long since settled adversely to their 
claim.”). 
 39. Morton Salt, 338 U.S. at 652 (citations omitted). 
 40. In dicta in two concurrences, a Supreme Court Justice has taken Mor-
ton Salt as establishing that corporations have not just an unequal right, but 
no right to privacy. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 
U.S. 257, 284 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 184 (1951) (Jack-
son, J., concurring). Without providing a citation, Justice Rehnquist stated in 
a dissent in which he argued against negative free speech rights for corpora-
tions: “This argument is bolstered by the fact that the two constitutional liber-
ties most closely analogous to the right to refrain from speaking—the Fifth 
Amendment right to remain silent and the constitutional right of privacy—
have been denied to corporations based on their corporate status.” Pac. Gas & 
Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 34 (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing). In addition, other courts have also cited Morton Salt or other cases for 
the proposition that corporations have no right to privacy. See infra note 43; 
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652IA, cmt. c (1977) (citing Mor-
ton Salt for the proposition that “[a] corporation has no such right of privacy”). 
 41. For the proposition that corporations “may and should have protection 
from unlawful demands made in the name of public investigation,” Morton 
Salt, 338 U.S. at 652, the Court cited American Tobacco, an opinion by Justice 
Holmes holding that the Federal Trade Commission did not have unlimited 
access to corporations’ papers in connection with an investigation about possi-
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context, and more general jurisprudential context show the 
Court did not hold that corporations have no right to privacy, 
but rather suggested that corporations have a Fourth Amend-
ment right unequal to that of individuals.42 
In sum, with its dated view of privacy and “no equality” 
phrasing, Morton Salt did not squarely resolve whether corpo-
rations have a constitutional right to privacy. While it rejected 
equality in privacy protection for corporations with regard to 
Fourth Amendment protection for the type of agency order it 
was addressing, it did not answer the question more generally 
or with regard to other privacy interests. 
B. POST-MORTON SALT: CONFLICT IN THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
COURTS 
Lower courts have relied on Morton Salt in reaching diver-
gent answers to the question of whether a corporation may 
claim a constitutional right to privacy. Their disparity under-
scores that Morton Salt left much unresolved and their reason-
ing—often conclusory, formalistic, or undeveloped—shows that 
the area needs greater illumination.  
 
ble unfair competition practices. FTC v. Am. Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298 (1924). 
There, the Court noted that while the Commission could access documentary 
evidence it could not consistent with the Fourth Amendment “direct fishing 
expeditions into private papers on the possibility that they may disclose evi-
dence of crime” because it would be “contrary to first principles of justice.” Id. 
at 306. 
 42. As a matter of precedential weight, it is worth noting that some jurists 
and commentators might additionally view the Morton Salt reasoning, based 
on the “concession” view of the corporation, as problematic. The “concession” 
view of corporations as creatures of the state, artificial beings subject to en-
hanced regulation, was developed and popularized between the seventeenth 
and nineteenth centuries, but the Supreme Court had largely shifted away 
from that view by 1950, and the Court has since called it an “extreme posi-
tion.” See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978) 
(characterizing the argument that “corporations, as creatures of the State, 
have only those rights granted them by the State” as an “extreme position”); 
see also, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Citizens United and the Corporate Form, 
2010 WIS. L. REV. 999, 1011–12 (discussing the decline of the concession view 
in the mid-nineteenth century). For arguments that the “concession” view of 
the corporation should be rehabilitated, see David Ciepley, Neither Persons 
nor Associations: Against Constitutional Rights for Corporations, 1 J.L. & CTS. 
2 (2013); Reza Dibadj, (Mis)conceptions of the Corporation, 29 GA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 731 (2013); Stefan Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, 66 OKLA. 
L. REV. 327 (2014).  
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1. Cases Rejecting a Corporate Constitutional Right to Privacy 
Nearly a dozen courts have cited Morton Salt, with little 
explanation, for the proposition that corporations do not have a 
constitutional right to privacy.43 The Ninth Circuit has come to 
 
 43. Arnold v. Pa. Dep’t of Transp., 477 F.3d 105, 111 (3d Cir. 2007) (stat-
ing that “[t]he District Court correctly found that, as an entity, Baker clearly 
had no privacy interest capable of protection at stake here” and citing Morton 
Salt (internal quotation marks omitted)); Crum & Crum Enters., Inc. v. NDC 
of Cal., L.P., Civ. No. 09-145 (RBK), 2011 WL 886356, at *3 (D. Del. Mar. 10, 
2011) (stating “business entities do not have a right to privacy” and citing Ar-
nold with internal citation to Morton Salt); Fla. Ass’n of Prof’l Lobbyists, Inc. 
v. Div. of Legislative Info. Servs., 431 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1236 (N.D. Fla. 2006) 
(rejecting privacy claims of lobbying firms because the federal constitutional 
right to privacy extends only to natural persons, and citing California Bankers 
Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 65 (1974), with internal quotation to Morton 
Salt); Muratore v. Dep’t of Treasury, 315 F. Supp. 2d 305, 310–11 (W.D.N.Y. 
2004) (quoting as binding authority Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Brown-
ing-Ferris which relied on Morton Salt: “[T]he Supreme Court has held that ‘a 
corporation has no . . . right to privacy.’ A demand for ESI’s corporate docu-
ments, then, does not implicate the Fourth Amendment.” (citation omitted)); 
Doe v. Veneman, 230 F. Supp. 2d 739, 750 n.5 (W.D. Tex. 2002) (“[A] business 
organization is a person only by legal fiction. It is not an individual with Con-
stitutionally protected rights.” (citing Morton Salt, 338 U.S. at 651–52)), over-
ruled on other grounds, 380 F.3d 807 (5th Cir. 2004); Clinton Cmty. Hosp. 
Corp. v. S. Md. Med. Ctr., 374 F. Supp. 450, 456 (D. Md. 1974) (holding that a 
corporation cannot assert an injury to its aesthetic enjoyment of the environ-
ment under NEPA, and citing Morton Salt for the proposition that “[i]t is clear 
that corporations do not enjoy a right to privacy”); Warner-Lambert Co. v. 
Execuquest Corp., 691 N.E.2d 545, 548 (Mass. 1998) (denying a corporation a 
state statutory right to privacy, stating that “[c]ases from other jurisdictions 
unanimously deny a right of privacy to corporations,” and citing Morton Salt); 
Health Cent. v. Comm’r of Ins., 393 N.W.2d 625, 630 (Ct. App. Mich. 1986) 
(stating that “the right of privacy is primarily designed to protect the feelings 
and sensibilities of human beings and does not protect artificial entities” and 
citing Morton Salt); see also Oasis Nite Club, Inc. v. Diebold, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 
173, 175 (D. Md. 1966) (stating that as a corporation the plaintiff “cannot be 
said to possess a right of privacy” and citing Morton Salt, despite the case at 
hand being a civil suit between private parties) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); Ass’n for Pres. of Freedom of Choice, Inc. v. Emergency Civil Liber-
ties Comm., 236 N.Y.S.2d 216, 218 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966) (rejecting a corpora-
tion’s claim for privacy and citing Morton Salt for the proposition that “[t]here 
are statements in cases decided elsewhere that a corporation has no right of 
privacy”); supra note 40 (discussing dicta in two Supreme Court concurrences 
that reference Morton Salt as establishing that corporations have no right to 
privacy); cf. Regency Catering Servs., Inc. v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 640 F. 
Supp. 29, 30–31 (M.D. Pa. 1985) (rejecting a catering corporation’s privacy 
claim based on city disclosure of mouse infestation because constitutional pri-
vacy cases involved “intensely personal aspects of the private lives of individu-
als” and plaintiff failed to cite any case which held a corporation could claim a 
right to privacy); In re Food Int’l, Inc., Nos. 97-27194 JKF, 98-2173, 1999 WL 
1052525, at *6 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 1999) (following Regency Catering in 
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the same result, while providing a bit more reasoning. In Fleck 
& Associates, Inc. v. City of Phoenix, the Ninth Circuit rejected 
a corporation’s claim that a city ordinance prohibiting the oper-
ation of live sex act businesses violated its constitutional right 
to privacy.44 The corporation, a social club for gay men, specifi-
cally identified the source of its privacy right as the liberty 
guarantee described in Lawrence v. Texas.45 
The Ninth Circuit started its analysis with Morton Salt’s 
statement that “corporations can claim no equality with indi-
viduals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy.”46 It then rea-
soned that because corporations are not entitled to “purely per-
sonal guarantees”47 and because “it is hard to imagine a 
constitutional guarantee that could be more inherently person-
al and therefore unavailable to a corporate entity” than priva-
cy, corporations have no right to privacy.48 The court quoted 
Chief Justice Marshall’s well-known characterization of a cor-
poration as “an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and exist-
ing only in contemplation of law.”49 And in its own words, the 
court further explained: “Corporations are not self-defining au-
tonomous creatures worthy of respect and dignity in the rele-
vant sense. Neither do they have private lives, let alone ‘private 
lives in matters pertaining to sex’ as Fleck would have it.”50 
Thus, the court formalistically reasoned that because a corpo-
ration is an artificial being and not the type of creature that 
has a private life, corporations do not have a cognizable right to 
privacy. For this reason, the court ruled that the corporation 
had failed to plead “the invasion of any cognizable right,” and 
so had failed to establish standing.51 
 
rejecting a privacy claim of a restaurant corporation that had an incident pub-
licized about its cook allegedly spitting in a police officer’s food).  
 44. 471 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 45. Id. at 1104 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)). 
 46. Id. (quoting Morton Salt, 338 U.S. at 652). 
 47. Id. (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778 n.14). 
 48. Id. at 1104–05. 
 49. Id. at 1105 (quoting Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819)). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 1104. The court stated that Fleck’s claim was “really just a 
claim that Fleck should be allowed to champion the liberty interests of its cus-
tomers,” and that it could not do so under traditional standing doctrine be-
cause it failed to meet the constitutional requirements for standing. Id. at 
1105. Fleck also could not obtain associational standing because it did not 
have “members” as required by the doctrine because its “members” were mere-
ly customers and the purpose of the “association” was for profit, not to “‘ex-
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2. Cases Recognizing a Limited Corporate Constitutional 
Right to Privacy 
In contrast to the various state courts, federal district 
courts, and the Ninth Circuit, which have stated that corpora-
tions lack a right to privacy, either with a conclusory approach 
or based on the notion that corporations are artificial and un-
like natural persons, the D.C. Circuit and California state 
courts have recognized a limited corporate right to privacy.52 
These cases accord a lessened privacy right to corporations, giv-
ing a nod to Morton Salt’s “no equality” phrase, but nonetheless 
recognizing a right.53  
The beginning of this line of cases goes back over thirty 
years and involves a battle with the Church of Scientology over 
sealing and returning seized documents. In United States v. 
Hubbard, the D.C. Circuit found that the Church, a corporation 
and third party to the underlying litigation, had a privacy in-
terest in preventing its seized documents from becoming pub-
lic.54 The court left undefined the source of the privacy interest, 
but stated that it was at least partly a constitutional matter.55 
 
press the collective views and protect the collective interests’ of their mem-
bers.” Id. at 1105–06 (quoting Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 
U.S. 333, 345 (1977)). 
 52. A 1979 case from the District of Puerto Rico also suggested that corpo-
rations enjoy a limited privacy right. Colegio Puertorriqueño De Niñas, Liceo 
Ponceño, Inc. v. Pesquera De Busquets, 464 F. Supp. 761, 765–66 (1979). 
There, several private schools and a professional organization of private 
schools claimed that a state inquiry into the cost of running the schools violat-
ed their privacy rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments. Id. at 763. The court examined the right to privacy case law and 
stated: “The foregoing does not mean that corporations or other entities which 
do not possess human individuality do not enjoy privacy rights. However, their 
sphere of protected privacy is lesser in scope than that of individuals.” Id. at 
765 (citation omitted). The court concluded that the state inquiry there did not 
transgress the bounds of any constitutional guarantees, including a privacy 
interest in nondisclosure under Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977). Pesquera 
De Busquets, 464 F. Supp. at 766–68. 
 53. See supra Part I.A. 
 54. 650 F.2d 293, 307 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
 55. Id. at 302–03 (“Although we decline the Church’s invitation expressly 
to ground the Church’s protectible interests in the Constitution’s provisions, 
we find the kinds of interests asserted to have some constitutional footing, 
both cognate to and supportive of, constitutional rights.”). The court supported 
this assertion by noting that corporations have rights under the Fourth 
Amendment which “protect[s] legitimate expectations of privacy,” and it also 
generally referred to the right to privacy as stemming from the Fourteenth 
and Fifth Amendments which protect against deprivations of liberty and “en-
croachment upon a constitutionally recognized sphere of personal privacy.” Id. 
at 304–05. 
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Referencing Morton Salt as well as a mix of state and federal 
cases,56 the court concluded that while the “public attributes of 
corporations may indeed reduce pro tanto the reasonability of 
their expectation of privacy,” a bright line could not be drawn 
at the corporate structure.57 Instead, “the nature and purposes 
of the corporate entity and the nature of the interest sought to 
be protected will determine the question whether under given 
facts the corporation per se has a protectible privacy interest.”58 
Finally, without deeper explanation or greater specificity, the 
court emphasized that the corporation at hand was a church: 
“[W]hether acting for itself or on behalf of its members, surely 
the privacy interests of a ‘church’ must be assessed somewhat 
differently from the privacy interests of other sorts of ‘corpora-
tions.’”59  
Although later vacated on other grounds, another case 
from the D.C. Circuit also recognized a corporation as having a 
constitutional privacy interest in the nondisclosure of docu-
ments.60 In Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., non-party Mo-
bil Oil sought to seal its documents obtained in discovery and 
not used at trial.61 The panel reasoned that a court might impli-
cate a constitutional privacy interest in nondisclosure when it 
forces disclosure of personal information in the discovery con-
text, and in those circumstances a corporation’s interest would 
be “essentially identical” to an individual’s.62  
 
 56. Id. at 305–06. The Hubbard court referred to privacy as having been 
embraced both in D.C. and in California, seemingly because the documents 
seized from the Church of Scientology were from church buildings in Los An-
geles. Since Hubbard, California courts have clarified that corporations may 
not claim a right to privacy under the California Constitution. Roberts v. Gulf 
Oil Corp., 147 Cal. App. 3d 770, 791 (1983). 
 57. Hubbard, 650 F.2d at 306.  
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. (“[A]t least certain types of organizations—corporate or non-
corporate—should be able to assert in good faith the privacy interests of their 
members.”). 
 60. Tavoulareas v. Wash. Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacat-
ed on other grounds, 737 F.2d 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (per curiam). 
 61. Id. at 1014–15, 1023, 1028–29. 
 62. Id. at 1021–22, 1025–29 (recognizing that corporations have an une-
qual Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy, but that qualification is “to 
allow adequate policing of corporate conduct” which is not the purpose of dis-
covery; “The purpose of discovery is not affected by the fact that a party to the 
suit is a corporation.”). On rehearing, the en banc court vacated the panel de-
cision and remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration in light 
of a then-recent Supreme Court case, Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 
20 (1984). The en banc court left open its view of the panel’s decision regarding 
privacy; subsequently, other courts have continued to cite or discuss the pan-
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The California line of cases has relied on and amplified the 
D.C. Circuit case law. Most notably, in Roberts v. Gulf Oil 
Corp., concerning a subpoena duces tecum seeking information 
from a corporate taxpayer about its property, a California ap-
pellate court held that corporations do not have a right to pri-
vacy under the California Constitution, nor a fundamental 
right to privacy, but do have a “general right to privacy.”63 The 
court lodged this in “some combination of the Fourth Amend-
ment, the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection against arbi-
trary or unjustifiable state deprivations of liberty and the Fifth 
Amendment.”64 The court quoted at length from Morton Salt, 
and then citing the D.C. Circuit’s Hubbard case, stated: “Alt-
hough corporations have a lesser right to privacy than human 
beings and are not entitled to claim a right to privacy in terms 
of a fundamental right, some right to privacy exists. Privacy 
rights accorded to artificial entities are not stagnant, but de-
pend on the circumstances.”65 
The Roberts court then recognized two factors for determin-
ing the strength of a business entity’s privacy right: (1) the 
strength of the nexus between the entity and the human be-
ings, and (2) the context of the controversy.66 Applying this test, 
the court noted that “[w]ithout denigrating the fact that a cor-
poration does enjoy a right to privacy in some circumstances,” 
Gulf Oil did not in the case at hand because there was no nexus 
to an individual’s privacy and a privacy right would have been 
“unreasonable” in the context of determining Gulf Oil’s “fair 
share of taxes.”67  
 
el’s decision in Tavoulareas, despite its procedural infirmity. See, e.g., Lank-
ford v. City of Hobart, 27 F.3d 477, 479 (10th Cir. 1996); Cook v. Yellow 
Freight Sys., Inc., 132 F.R.D. 548, 550–51 (E.D. Cal. 1990), overruling recog-
nized on other grounds, Chatman v. Felker, No. Civ. S-03-2415 JAM, 2009 WL 
173515 (E.D. Cal. 2009); Avirgan v. Hull, 118 F.R.D. 257, 262 (D.D.C. 1987). 
But see Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps. v. Greenberg, 983 F.2d 286, 293 (D.C. Cir. 
1993) (“The court, sitting en banc, vacated the panel’s decision in Tavoulareas, 
and it therefore has no precedential value.”). 
 63. Roberts v. Gulf Oil Corp., 195 Cal. Rptr. 393, 406–12 (Ct. App. 1983). 
The court reasoned that Gulf Oil’s rights were not so fundamental as to re-
quire meticulous scrutiny because “[t]he interest of a taxpayer to be free from 
incursions into his or her files is not of the same constitutional significance as 
the personal right to determine whether to beget a child.” Id. at 410 (citing 
Morton Salt). 
 64. Id. at 410 (citations omitted). 
 65. Id. at 411. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 412. The court wove a bit of concession theory into its analysis 
(“Gulf is a corporation which exists at the pleasure of the state.”), but its con-
POLLMAN_4fmt 11/6/2014 3:54 PM 
2014] CORPORATE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 43 
 
Other California courts have followed Roberts,68 although 
sometimes assuming that corporations have such a right with-
out deciding the issue on the merits.69 Although the California 
case law consists of multiple cases spanning decades, the courts 
have not developed a framework for better understanding the 
 
clusion seems largely driven by the context of a corporation asserting a privacy 
right to prevent a tax assessor from obtaining information to determine its 
corporate taxes. 
 68. Lazaro v. Lomarey, Inc., No. C 09-02013 RMW (PVT), 2010 WL 
3636207, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2010) (granting motion to compel against 
corporate defendant, but noting that corporations have some right to privacy); 
Saca v. J.P. Molyneux Studio Ltd., No. CIV-S06-2818 MCE EFB, 2008 WL 
62181, at *4–5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2008) (noting that “[t]he privacy rights of 
businesses are accorded . . . less weight” and including business entities’ pri-
vacy interests in balancing analysis); Whittall v. Henry Schein, Inc., No. 
CIVS051629 WBJ BCH, 2006 WL 902571, at *3–4 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2006) 
(balancing “[b]oth corporate and individual privacy rights . . . at issue”); 
S.B.C.C., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 112 Cal. Rptr. 3d 40, 50 (Ct. 
App. 2010) (interpreting an insurance provision using the phrase “a person’s 
right to privacy” with reference to California’s line of privacy cases stemming 
from the context of discovery and subpoenas); Ameri-Med. Corp. v. Workers’ 
Comp. Appeals Bd., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 366, 383–84 (Ct. App. 1996) (holding re-
spondents had a legitimate interest in determining whether non-reimbursable 
fees were included in a medical bill pertinent to their workers’ compensation 
claim, but they “[did] not have an automatic right to unfettered access to books 
and records regarding the medical clinic’s overall business operation” and the 
clinic corporation “retain[ed] a privacy interest in financial and employment 
information”). 
 69. Conn. Indem. Co. v. Superior Court, 3 P.3d 868, 874–75 (Cal. 2000) 
(assuming without deciding that corporate entities had constitutional privacy 
rights where the trial court had not yet ruled on the privacy claims in a case 
concerning the validity of subpoenas issued by a city council investigating 
groundwater contamination); 420 Caregivers, LLC v. City of Los Angeles, 163 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 17, 42 (Ct. App. 2012) (assuming, without deciding, that medici-
nal marijuana collectives “have certain privacy expectations in the records 
subject to disclosure” pursuant to a city ordinance, but holding there was no 
invasion of privacy “given the heavily regulated area in which the collectives 
operate”); Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 833, 846–47 
(Ct. App. 2007) (“While we recognize there are serious questions as to the ap-
plication of a federal right of privacy to corporations, we follow the approach 
adopted by the court in Connecticut Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court, and de-
cline to address the merits of the issue in this case . . . .” (citation omitted)); see 
also Hecht, Solberg, Robinson, Goldberg & Bagley v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 446, 457 (Ct. App. 2006) (assuming without deciding that a limited 
liability partnership has privacy rights). In rejecting a corporation’s privacy 
claim under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, a recent case in the 
Southern District of Florida likewise seemed to assume that a corporation 
could claim such a right to privacy. See Palmat Intl., Inc. v. Holder, No. 12-
20229-CIV, 2013 WL 594695, at *4–5 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 14, 2013) (rejecting an 
individual and corporation’s claim that releasing bank records pursuant to a 
treaty between Argentina and the United States would violate their right to 
informational privacy under the U.S. Constitution). 
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constitutional footing or definition of the right for corporations, 
the different forms of constitutional privacy or contexts in 
which a corporation’s privacy interests might be implicated, 
and what it means to grant the corporation a privacy right at 
the entity level.  
II.  APPROACHES TO CORPORATE CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS   
The preceding Part showed that whether corporations have 
a constitutional right to privacy is an open question, and it 
highlighted the divergent approaches and results in the lower 
courts that have previously gone unexamined. Courts have 
struggled to find a coherent way of thinking about this chal-
lenging issue as it involves the amorphous and indeterminate 
right to privacy and the theoretical and doctrinal difficulty of 
corporate rights analysis.  
The importance of this observation is two-fold: first, it 
shows there is an opportunity for scholarly insight to be 
brought to bear on this jurisprudential issue and second, it il-
lustrates the deeper problem that courts lack a coherent ap-
proach to determining the scope of corporate constitutional 
rights. The remainder of this Article aims to shed light on the 
corporate privacy question, and in so doing, to provide more 
generalizable insights for other timely topics such as corporate 
speech and free exercise rights.70  
As a starting point, in order to understand why most cor-
porations in most circumstances should not have a right to pri-
vacy, it is helpful to first understand why corporations receive 
any constitutional protection and how the Supreme Court has 
approached these questions in the past. 
A. CORPORATE RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE  
The U.S. Constitution does not specifically mention corpo-
rations. As a matter of constitutional text, no explanation is 
provided regarding the application of constitutional provisions 
 
 70. For a discussion of whether business corporations have free exercise 
rights, see Ronald J. Colombo, The Naked Private Square, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1 
(2013); James D. Nelson, Conscience, Incorporated, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
1565 (2013); Elizabeth Sepper, Contraception and the Birth of Corporate Con-
science, 22 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & LAW 303 (2014); Mark Tushnet, Do 
For-Profit Corporations Have Rights of Religious Conscience?, 99 CORNELL L. 
REV. ONLINE 70 (2013), http://cornelllawreview.org/files/2013/12/99CLRO70 
-November.pdf. 
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to corporations.71 It was thus left to the courts to decide wheth-
er corporations were the subject of constitutional protections, or 
holders of rights, and whether those rights were coextensive 
with the scope of individual rights. 
The Supreme Court first addressed these questions in the 
early nineteenth century in cases involving Article III diversity 
jurisdiction, the Contract Clause, and the Privileges and Im-
munities Clause of Article IV. The Court showed a willingness 
to extend constitutional protections to corporations in order to 
protect rights of the people composing the corporation. For ex-
ample, in the 1809 case Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 
the Supreme Court stated that the corporate entity was not a 
“citizen” for purposes of Article III diversity jurisdiction, but 
that it could look to the natural persons composing a corpora-
tion and find that diversity jurisdiction exists where there is 
complete diversity of state citizenship between the sharehold-
ers of a corporate party and the opposing party.72 In the 1819 
case of Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, the Court 
held that a state legislature’s act to unilaterally alter a corpo-
rate charter violated the Contract Clause.73 The Court ex-
plained that although incorporation required a government 
grant, the corporation had been “endowed by private individu-
als” and represented a contract covered by the protection of the 
Contract Clause.74  
The Court’s willingness to extend protections to corpora-
tions in order to protect the constitutional rights of the individ-
uals behind the corporation was limited, however. In the 1839 
case of Bank of Augusta v. Earle, the Court ruled that while 
corporations may, according to the citizenship of their individ-
ual members, be treated as “citizens” for purposes of Article III 
diversity jurisdiction, they are not “citizens” for purposes of Ar-
 
 71. ASHUTOSH BHAGWAT, THE MYTH OF RIGHTS: THE PURPOSES AND LIM-
ITS OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 10–15 (2010) (noting the absence of textual 
reference or explanation of the treatment of corporations in the Constitution). 
 72. Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 86 (1809), over-
ruled by Louisville, Cincinnati, & Charleston R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 
497 (1844) (holding that a corporation is treated as a “citizen” of the state in 
which it is incorporated for purposes of diversity jurisdiction); Marshall v. Bal-
timore & Ohio R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314 (1854) (establishing a conclusive 
presumption that all shareholders of a corporation are citizens of the state of 
incorporation for purposes of diversity jurisdiction). 
 73. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 650 
(1819). 
 74. Id. at 632–39, 641–50. 
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ticle IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause.75 The Court ex-
pressed concern that if it were to look through the corporate 
form to the persons composing the corporation, it would un-
dermine the limited liability protections that were gaining ac-
ceptance at the time and give those operating through the cor-
porate form “far higher and greater privileges than are enjoyed 
by the citizens of the state itself.”76 Thus, in some instances, the 
characteristics of the corporate form prevented the Court from 
according corporations some constitutional protections.  
In the later part of the nineteenth century, the Court rec-
ognized equal protection and due process protections for corpo-
rations under the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments.77 The 
Court gave little explanation for these rulings, but justified this 
extension of constitutional protection on the basis that it pro-
tected the property interests of the people associating through 
the corporate form.78 Justice Field explained, for example: “Pri-
vate corporations are, it is true, artificial persons, but with the 
exception of a sole corporation, with which we are not con-
cerned, they consist of aggregations of individuals united for 
some legitimate business.”79 Further, “[i]t would be a most sin-
gular result if a constitutional provision intended for the pro-
tection of every person against partial and discriminating legis-
lation by the states, should cease to exert such protection the 
moment the person becomes a member of a corporation.”80  
 
 75. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 586 (1839). 
 76. Id. 
 77. See Noble v. Union River Logging R.R., 147 U.S. 165, 274 (1893); Min-
neapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 28 (1889); Pembina 
Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 188–89 
(1888); Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886) (headnotes). 
For a discussion of the Santa Clara case, see Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving 
Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1629, 1642–45. 
 78. See Blair & Pollman, supra note 25; Pollman, supra note 77, at 1644–
45. 
 79. This quote comes from Justice Field’s lower court opinion, sitting by 
designation in County of San Mateo v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 13 F. 722, 
743 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882), which was related to County of Santa Clara v. South-
ern Pacific Railroad, 18 F. 385, 402 (C.C.D. Cal. 1883). See also Pembina 
Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co., 125 U.S. at 189 (“[C]orporations are 
merely associations of individuals united for a special purpose . . . .”); Blair & 
Pollman, supra note 25, (manuscript at 12–20) (discussing the rationale of Su-
preme Court jurisprudence from the late nineteenth century recognizing cor-
porations as having equal protection and due process protections under the 
Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments concerning property interests). 
 80. Cnty. of San Mateo, 13 F. at 744. 
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Notably, the Court again extended these protections in the 
context of protecting the property interests of shareholders and 
based on a view of the corporation as an association. Again the 
Court also limited the scope of protection where the right, or a 
portion of the right, at issue could not be held derivatively by 
the corporation. The Court, for example, clarified that while 
due process protections extend to protect corporate property, 
the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment is “the lib-
erty of natural, not artificial persons.”81 Further, as with Article 
IV, the Court held that corporations are not “citizens” for pur-
poses of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.82 Thus, while the Court extended protections to 
corporations to protect the property interests of the persons as-
sociating through the corporate form, it did not confuse corpo-
rations with “citizens,” and it recognized limits to maintain 
states’ power to regulate corporations for the public good.83 Jus-
tice Field explained that due process protection extended to 
corporations for property “because the property of a corporation 
[was] in fact the property of the corporators,” but that life and 
liberty protections did not because “the lives and liberties of the 
 
 81. Nw. Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255 (1906); see also 
Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 527 (1939) (noting “the liberty 
guaranteed by the due process clause is the liberty of natural, not artificial, 
persons”); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (explaining that 
corporations “cannot claim for themselves the liberty which the Fourteenth 
Amendment guarantees,” but they can claim protection for their business and 
property); W. Turf Ass’n v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359, 363 (1907) (“[T]he liberty 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment against deprivation without due 
process of law is the liberty of natural, not artificial, persons.”); Ruth H. Bloch 
& Naomi Lamoreaux, Corporations and the Fourteenth Amendment 4–23 (un-
published manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing how the Court parsed 
the Fourteenth Amendment in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries so that the due process protection for liberty did not extend to corpora-
tions). 
 82. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 178–82 (1868). 
 83. See Bloch & Lamoreaux, supra note 81, at 8–23 (explaining that the 
Court “articulated limits on the applicability to corporations of the due-process 
and privileges-and-immunities clauses” in the same cases that extended the 
Fourteenth-Amendment guarantee of equal protection to corporations); see al-
so Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 257 (1898) (“Nor must we be understood as 
saying that a State may not, by its courts, retain within its limits the assets of 
a foreign corporation, in order that justice may be done to its own citizens; nor, 
by appropriate action of its judicial tribunals, see to it that its own citizens are 
not unjustly discriminated against . . . .”); Paul, 75 U.S. at 181 (explaining 
that applying the Privileges and Immunities Clause to corporations would be 
“utterly destructive of the independence and the harmony of the States”). 
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individual corporators are not the life and liberty of the corpo-
ration.”84  
In the early twentieth century, the Court recognized corpo-
rations as subject to corporate criminal liability.85 In Hale v. 
Henkel, the Court held that corporations enjoy Fourth Amend-
ment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures 
but may not claim the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.86 The Court justified Fourth Amendment protec-
tion for corporations again on the basis that corporations are 
associations of individuals with rights: “A corporation is, after 
all, but an association of individuals under an assumed name 
and with a distinct legal entity. In organizing itself as a collec-
tive body it waives no constitutional immunities appropriate to 
such body.”87 But the Court explained that a corporation cannot 
claim the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 
because that right “is purely a personal privilege of the wit-
ness.”88 The Court explained “[i]t was never intended to permit 
him [the corporate agent] to plead the fact that some third per-
son might be incriminated by his testimony, even though he 
were the agent of such person.”89 The Court thus drew a line be-
tween the rights that corporations derived from the people 
composing them and the rights that belonged to people only as 
individuals.  
Over time, the Court’s distinction between the property 
and liberty protections for corporations faded. This started in 
1936 with the Court’s selective incorporation and extension of 
speech and press rights to newspaper corporations in Grosjean 
v. American Press Co.,90 and was further developed in the 1950s 
and 60s when the Court began to recognize associational and 
speech rights of nonprofit organizations such as the NAACP91 
 
 84. Cnty. of San Mateo, 13 F. at 747. 
 85. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494–
96 (1909). 
 86. 201 U.S. 43, 69–70, 75–76 (1906). 
 87. Id. at 76. 
 88. Id. at 69. 
 89. Id. 
 90. 297 U.S. 233, 242–51 (1936). 
 91. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428 (1963) (validating the 
NAACP’s claim that a state statutory ban on improper solicitation of legal 
business abridged “the freedoms of the First Amendment, protected against 
state action by the Fourteenth”); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 
U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (validating the NAACP’s freedom of association and not-
ing that “freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and 
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and continued to extend speech and press rights to media cor-
porations such as The New York Times.92 The cases involving 
media corporations paid little attention to the corporate identi-
ty of the parties, but rather emphasized the purpose the press 
serves “as a vital source of public information.”93 The NAACP 
cases relied heavily on the associational nature of the particu-
lar corporation, which was understood as engaging in “coopera-
tive, organizational activity”94 and asserting the rights of its 
members rather than having personhood of its own.95 
Following this recognition of constitutional protections for 
media corporations and nonprofit membership corporations 
came the Court’s extension of First Amendment protections to 
corporations through the commercial speech doctrine96 and in 
the context of corporate political spending.97 This period from 
the 1970s to the present has represented a significant expan-
sion of constitutional protections for ordinary business corpora-
tions, as the Court has come to see them as capable of asserting 
rights to participate in the marketplace of ideas and as a source 
of information that is useful to consumers.98 While these deci-
sions are subject to important criticism on a number of 
grounds, for the purposes at hand we can observe that the 
Court has continued to rely on the associational rationale in ex-
tending rights to corporations, deriving rights for corporations 
from those of its members or participants, in addition to de-
pending on the rights of consumers and listeners in hearing the 
speech or information of the corporation.99 The commercial 
 
ideas is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech”). 
 92. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264 (1964). 
 93. Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 250; see also id. at 243 (emphasizing the im-
portance of “the natural right of the members of an organized society, united 
for their common good, to impart and acquire information about their common 
interests”); id. at 245–51 (discussing the history and importance of freedom of 
press). 
 94. Button, 371 U.S. at 430. 
 95. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 458.  
 96. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 
U.S. 557, 561 (1980); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976). 
 97. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916 (2010); FEC v. Mass. Citi-
zens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 263 (1986); First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 
435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978). 
 98. See Blair & Pollman, supra note 25, (manuscript at 40–50) for further 
analysis of the Court’s notable expansion of constitutional protections for 
business corporations from this period. 
 99. See id. (manuscript at 35–54); Adam Winkler, Citizens United, Per-
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speech cases, for instance, are grounded in consumers’ right to 
receive information,100 and corporate political spending cases 
refer to corporations as “associations” and “associations of citi-
zens,” as in Citizens United v. FEC, and base their reasoning in 
large part on the rights of listeners.101 
B. METHOD FOR DETERMINING CORPORATE RIGHTS  
As we have seen, the Court has confronted issues concern-
ing the applicability and scope of constitutional protections for 
corporations for over two hundred years. In all of this time, it 
has failed to articulate a test or standard approach for its rul-
ings. Sometimes the Court has looked to the purpose and histo-
ry of the right at issue to determine whether to accord it to a 
corporation, while at other times the Court simply accorded a 
right to corporations without explanation or in a conclusory 
oral remark.102 Often the Court’s reasoning reflects a concept of 
the corporation—as a concession from the state, as an aggre-
gate of people, or as a real entity—that seemingly justifies the 
grant or denial of the right. None of these conceptions of the 
corporation succeed, however, in both accurately describing the 
wide range of modern corporations and justifying why corpora-
tions would hold rights.103  
 
sonhood, and the Corporation in Politics (unpublished manuscript) (manu-
script at 3–5) (on file with author). 
 100. E.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763–65. 
 101. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 900, 904, 907, 908 (referring to corpora-
tions as “associations” and “associations of citizens”); see id. at 900 (“Corpora-
tions and other associations, like individuals, contribute to the discussion, de-
bate, and the dissemination of information and ideas that the First 
Amendment seeks to foster. The Court has thus rejected the argument that 
political speech of corporations or other associations should be treated differ-
ently under the First Amendment simply because such associations are not 
natural persons.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777 (“It is the type of speech indispensable to 
decisionmaking in a democracy, and this is no less true because the speech 
comes from a corporation rather than an individual.”). 
 102. For discussions of the Supreme Court’s various approaches to deter-
mining the scope of corporate rights, see Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Im-
personal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 629 
(1990); Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns, Inc.: Citizens United, McDonald, and the 
Future of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 887, 908–30 
(2011); Pollman, supra note 77, at 1635–61. 
 103. For further discussion of these conceptions of the corporation and the 
difficulty of using them as a justification for determining the scope of corpo-
rate rights, see Pollman, supra note 77. For an argument that corporate con-
stitutional rights should be determined with reference to the Article III stand-
ing doctrine, see Brandon L. Garrett, The Constitutional Standing of 
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In addition, the so-called doctrine of corporate personhood 
does not provide guidance for determining the scope of corpo-
rate rights. Contrary to public belief,104 the Court’s jurispru-
dence extending constitutional protections to corporations does 
not do so on the basis that corporations themselves, as legal en-
tities, are like natural persons. Rather, the doctrine of corpo-
rate personhood merely stands for the principle that a corpora-
tion can be accorded protections in order to protect the rights of 
the individuals associated through the corporate form.105 It does 
not provide a method for determining the scope of protections—
that is, the doctrine does not instruct courts to formalistically 
apply the legal conclusion that the corporation is a “person” as 
a mode of reasoning. The Ninth Circuit made this mistake in 
Fleck, reasoning that corporations have no constitutional right 
to privacy because corporations are not the type of creature 
that has privacy; they are not “self-defining autonomous crea-
tures worthy of respect and dignity” and they have no “private 
lives.”106 To be sure, if we define privacy as autonomy or liberty 
 
Corporations, 163 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2330972. 
 104. E.g., PAUL KENS, THE SUPREME COURT UNDER MORRISON R. WAITE, 
1874–1888 124 (2010) (“The standard interpretation today is that the Santa 
Clara case established a doctrine of corporate personhood that eventually gave 
corporations most of the rights held by natural persons.”); Adam Winker, Yes, 
Corporations Are People, SLATE (Mar. 17, 2014, 11:52 AM), http://www 
.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/03/corporations_are_
people_and_that_s_why_hobby_lobby_should_lose_at_the_supreme.html (not-
ing popular misunderstanding of corporate personhood). For an example of 
common phrasing in the media, see Adam Schiff, The Supreme Court Still 
Thinks Corporations Are People, THE ATLANTIC (July 18, 2012, 3:11 PM), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/07/the-supreme-court-still 
-thinks-corporations-are-people/259995 (noting the Court concluded in Citizens 
United that “corporations are people—at least as far as the First Amendment 
is concerned”). 
 105. See KENS, supra note 104, at 124; see also Blair & Pollman, supra note 
25. The discussion of rights in this Article focuses on the treatment of corpora-
tions under the Constitution, not the separate topic of the status of corpora-
tions as legal entities with the ability to do certain things such as hold proper-
ty, contract, sue and be sued, and the policy of limited liability. For a 
discussion of the distinction between corporate constitutional rights and the 
entity status or legal personality of corporations, see Pollman, supra note 77, 
at 1638–39. 
 106. See Fleck & Assocs. v. City of Phx., 471 F.3d 1100, 1105 (2006). Like-
wise, in considering whether corporations may claim the “personal privacy” 
exemption under FOIA, the Supreme Court similarly noted that “[personal 
privacy] suggests a type of privacy evocative of human concerns—not the sort 
usually associated with an entity like, say, AT&T.” FCC v. AT&T, Inc., 131 S. 
Ct. 1177, 1183 (2011). Notably, that case did not call upon the Court “to pass 
on the scope of a corporation’s ‘privacy’ interests as a matter of constitutional 
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in intimate human decisions or activities and we look at the 
corporation only as an artificial entity, not representing human 
interests, it would follow that the corporation is not an apt pri-
vacy right holder—corporations have no soul, they cannot en-
gage in sexual activity, etc. But this misses the mark. This 
formalistic reasoning is divorced from the reason corporations 
receive rights in the first instance. As Part II.A above has 
shown, corporations do not receive rights because the charac-
teristics of the entity so closely resemble a natural human so as 
to merit granting the right; rather corporations receive rights 
because, as forms of organizing human enterprise, they have 
natural persons involved in them, and sometimes it is neces-
sary to accord protection to the corporation to protect their in-
terests.107  
Perhaps the closest the Court has come to providing a cor-
porate rights test was in a footnote in First National Bank of 
Boston v. Bellotti, in which the Court stated that it examines 
whether a right is “purely personal” in determining whether it 
applies to corporations: 
Certain “purely personal” guarantees, such as the privilege against 
compulsory self-incrimination, are unavailable to corporations and 
other organizations because the “historic function” of the particular 
guarantee has been limited to the protection of individuals. Whether 
or not a particular guarantee is “purely personal” or is unavailable to 
 
or common law,” but it nonetheless reflects the potential for unmeasured rea-
soning based on the likeness between corporations and humans. Id. at 1179. 
Scholars have also suggested this line of thinking when discussing corporate 
rights. See, e.g., STEVENSON, supra note 12, at 51 (“Corporations—and other 
organizations—can make no direct claim to the benefits of those social and le-
gal rules, for their fictional ‘personalities’ do not partake of the characteristics 
wherein the rules find their basis.”); id. at 69 (“As a jurist with a sense of hu-
mor once put it, ‘[I]f you don’t have any privates, you’re not entitled to any pri-
vacy.’”). 
 107. The notion that the corporation holds a right to protect human inter-
ests has led some to term corporate rights as “derivative.” Meir Dan-Cohen 
has, for example, explained that a derivative right serves “to safeguard or en-
hance the enjoyment of certain rights by others.” Meir Dan-Cohen, Freedoms 
of Collective Speech: A Theory of Protected Communications by Organizations, 
Communities, and the State, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 1229, 1246 (1991); see MEIR 
DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS 58–60 (1986) (“A may 
have a right because of either of two reasons. A right may be recognized in A 
out of concern for A himself. In such a case, A has an original right. A right in 
A may also result from a concern not for him but for B. In this case, A will be 
said to have a derivative right.”); cf. HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, 
THE CORPORATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 143 (1995) (“It follows, for exam-
ple, from the fact that the corporation is a nexus of contracts rather than a 
creature of state law, that personal rights in the Constitution should be ap-
plied to individuals connected with the firm rather than to the firm itself.”). 
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corporations for some other reason depends on the nature, history, 
and purpose of the particular constitutional provision.108 
The Court has not consistently used this approach or shown 
that it would be possible to do so in the context of corporations. 
First, the Court has not explained what it means by a “purely 
personal” right. Further, basing the determination of whether a 
right is “purely personal” on the “historic function” of the guar-
antee is problematic insofar as the Court has not consistently 
done this in the past,109 and, in instances where the Court or 
individual justices have looked to history, widely varying his-
torical narratives have been given about the founders’ views of 
corporations and their rights.110  
Although the Court has failed to articulate one, a 
consistent framework for analyzing corporate claims to 
constitutional protections is possible. We can follow the 
underlying logic of the Court’s jurisprudence, set out above in 
II.A, and read the Bellotti footnote in a consistent light. The 
notion of a “purely personal” right can thus be understood as 
referring to whether a right can be held in association or 
derivatively. As the Court explained when it refused to extend 
a corporation the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, that right inheres only in an individual in his or 
her individual capacity.111 It is simply not the type of right that 
can be exercised in association with others or asserted 
derivatively. Another example of such a right would be the 
right to vote. It is only meant to inhere in an individual acting 
 
 108. 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978) (citation omitted); see also Browning-
Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 284 (1989) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 109. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Corporations and Free Speech, in THE POLI-
TICS OF LAW 253, 256 (David Kairys ed., 1982) (arguing the Court did not look 
to the historic function of the Fourteenth Amendment when it “converted an 
amendment primarily designed to protect the rights of blacks into an amend-
ment whose major effect, for the next seventy years, was to protect the rights 
of corporations”). 
 110. E.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 906 (2010) (acknowledg-
ing that “[t]he Framers may not have anticipated modern business and media 
corporations”); cf. id. at 925–26 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that despite 
small numbers the corporation was “a familiar figure in [early] American eco-
nomic life,” and that it is unclear that corporations were “despised” and that 
the Framers would have excluded them from the First Amendment even if 
they were despised (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 948–50 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Framers “conceived of speech more nar-
rowly than we now think of it,” and understood corporations as being subject 
to “comprehensive[] regulat[ion] in the service of the public welfare”).  
 111. See supra text accompanying notes 86–89. 
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in his or her individual capacity and it cannot be asserted as a 
right by another. By contrast, corporate rights are, by their 
nature, derivative and instrumental.112 Incorporation creates a 
separate legal identity. Rights do not originate in corporations 
qua corporations. They are accorded to corporations only when 
necessary to protect the rights of natural persons involved in 
the corporation, or on an instrumental basis to protect the 
rights of other persons affected as listeners or consumers. The 
Court has at times lost sight of this logic and its limits, but it 
is, at core, on this basis that a bank was treated as a “citizen” of 
a state for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, the corporate 
charter of a private college may be protected under the 
Contract Clause, and the NAACP has a claim to freedom of 
association.113  
Thus, this Article asserts that in determining whether to 
accord a right to a corporation, we must look to whether the 
purpose of the right is served by according it to the corporation 
in question—that is, whether it is necessary to protect natural 
persons—and if the right is of a type that inheres only in an 
individual in his or her individual capacity.114 This requires 
analyzing the purpose of the right and the natural persons 
involved in the corporation. Furthermore, the derivative nature 
of rights for corporations requires paying attention to 
distinctions between different corporations because not all can 
be fairly regarded as representing any particular natural 
person or group of natural persons from whom rights can be 
derived.115  
III.  A CORPORATE RIGHT TO PRIVACY?   
With the problem and methodology now framed, we turn to 
whether corporations should have a constitutional right to pri-
vacy. This analysis begins by examining the purpose and na-
ture of the right to privacy, to the extent this can be gleaned 
 
 112. Blair & Pollman, supra note 25 (manuscript at 1). 
 113. See supra Part II.A for a discussion of these and other corporate rights 
cases decided by the Supreme Court. 
 114. For a more detailed discussion of the merits of this approach, see 
Pollman, supra note 77. See also Martin Petrin, Reconceptualizing the Theory 
of the Firm—From Nature to Function, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 1 (2013). Nota-
bly, this approach addresses the preliminary inquiry for rights determina-
tions—whether corporations hold that particular right at all; it does not an-
swer under what circumstances or level of scrutiny a countervailing interest 
might prevail.  
 115. Blair & Pollman, supra note 25 (manuscript at 1). 
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from Supreme Court jurisprudence and scholarly conceptions. 
The challenge, then, is to better understand whether the pur-
pose (or purposes) of the right to privacy would be served by ac-
cording it to corporations and whether privacy is a right that 
inheres only in an individual capacity. 
A. THE PURPOSE AND NATURE OF THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
The notion of privacy has long factored into constitutional 
adjudication as a value protected by various provisions of the 
Constitution,116 including, for example, the Fourth Amendment, 
which turns on a reasonable expectation of privacy test.117 But 
it was not until 1965 in Griswold v. Connecticut that the Su-
preme Court announced an independent constitutional right to 
privacy.118 The Court famously found the right in the “zones of 
privacy” or “penumbras” of several guarantees in the Bill of 
Rights, “formed by emanations from those guarantees that help 
give them life and substance.”119 The Court specifically identi-
fied the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments as 
guarantees that create zones of privacy.120 
After Griswold, a trickle rather than a torrent of other Su-
preme Court privacy cases have followed. The relatively small 
number and uniqueness of these cases have made the area dif-
ficult to generalize. The Court itself has sorted the cases and 
the interests acknowledged therein as forming two branches: 
decisional privacy and informational privacy.121  
The decisional privacy cases, or what might be categorized 
as privacy cases concerning autonomy in decisions or actions, 
include the right of persons to be free from government intru-
sions in areas of reproductive freedom, sexuality, and family re-
lationships. This line of cases includes the widely known, 
landmark decisions of Griswold (striking down a state law that 
prohibited use of contraceptives),122 Roe v. Wade (disallowing 
 
 116. See, e.g., FREDERICK S. LANE, AMERICAN PRIVACY: THE 400-YEAR HIS-
TORY OF OUR MOST CONTESTED RIGHT 153–55 (2009). 
 117. Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. 
L. REV. 503, 504 (2007). 
 118. 381 U.S. 479, 484–85 (1965). 
 119. Id. Justice Goldberg’s concurrence, joined by Chief Justice Warren and 
Justice Brennan, advanced the Ninth Amendment as a source of authority for 
privacy rights, absent an express reference to privacy in other provisions. Id. 
at 486–99 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
 120. Id. at 484 (majority opinion). 
 121. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599–600 (1977). 
 122. Griswold, 381 U.S. 479. 
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many restrictions on abortion),123 and Lawrence v. Texas (inval-
idating a state law criminalizing certain sexual conduct by per-
sons of the same sex).124 
On the whole, these cases have provided a rather murky 
view of the purpose of the right to privacy. It is unclear wheth-
er a proper understanding would draw the line narrowly 
around particular areas or activities, such as the right of priva-
cy in sexual relations, or more broadly to encompass a more in-
clusive, vague notion like personal or fundamental liberty.125 
The latter view arguably finds support in the fact that since 
Griswold the Court has grounded privacy cases in the Equal 
Protection Clause and the right to liberty under the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.126 
The other branch, a right to informational privacy or non-
disclosure of personal information, occupies a precarious posi-
tion as the Supreme Court has only assumed without deciding 
that the right exists, and a party has never prevailed on that 
claim in the Supreme Court.127 This line of cases started in 1977 
 
 123. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 124. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hard-
wick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)). For other cases protecting the right to make auton-
omous decisions, see Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 
(1992) (plurality opinion) (abortion); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) 
(marriage by prisoners); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) 
(plurality opinion) (use of contraceptives by minors); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 
U.S. 438 (1972) (use of contraceptives by single people); Stanley v. Georgia, 
394 U.S. 557 (1969) (possession of pornography within one’s home); Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (interracial marriage). For cases discussing privacy 
that predate the Court’s recognition of an independent privacy right, see 
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165–67 (1944) (acknowledging the 
“private realm of family life”); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 
U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (describing the forced sterilization of convicts as the dep-
rivation of a basic liberty); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (dis-
cussing the freedom to decide how to educate one’s children); Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (protecting the freedom to educate one’s children 
in different languages).  
 125. Some scholars have questioned whether these cases are best under-
stood as presenting privacy harms in the first instance. See, e.g., Calo, supra 
note 26, at 1137. 
 126. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564–76 (discussing privacy case law histo-
ry). 
 127. Lower courts have more significantly developed the jurisprudence on a 
right to nondisclosure of information. The majority of circuit courts have rec-
ognized that the Constitution does provide some protection against the disclo-
sure of private information. See Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz. v. Lawall, 307 
F.3d 783, 789–90 (9th Cir. 2002); Anderson v. Romero, 72 F.3d 518, 522 (7th 
Cir. 1995); James v. City of Douglas, Ga., 941 F.2d 1539, 1543 (11th Cir. 1991) 
(per curiam); Daury v. Smith, 842 F.2d 9, 13 (1st Cir. 1988); Barry v. City of 
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with Whalen v. Roe, marking the first time the Court suggested 
that a constitutional right to privacy includes a right to avoid 
disclosure of information.128 In Whalen, patients claimed that a 
New York statute authorizing the state to collect the names 
and addresses of people prescribed dangerous drugs had violat-
ed their privacy.129 The information collected was stored in a 
central computer file and only a small number of public health 
officials had access to the information.130 In discussing the pri-
vacy claim, the Court observed that “[t]he cases sometimes 
characterized as protecting ‘privacy’” actually concerned “at 
least two different kinds of interests”: an interest in “making 
certain kinds of important decisions” without government in-
terference and an “interest in avoiding disclosure of personal 
matters.”131 The patients claimed that the state statute threat-
ened to impair both their interest in making health care deci-
sions and in nondisclosure of information.132  
While the Court recognized that a duty to avoid unwar-
ranted disclosures of data collected and used for public purpos-
es “arguably has its roots in the Constitution,” the Court con-
cluded that the statute in question did not violate “any right or 
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”133 The Court 
relied on the statute being “manifestly the product of an orderly 
and rational legislative decision” regarding the state’s interest 
in controlling distribution of dangerous drugs and on the stat-
ute containing provisions for securely maintaining the infor-
mation and preventing its public disclosure.134 
After Whalen, the Court again referred to a right to non-
disclosure of information in Nixon v. Administrator of General 
Services.135 There, the Court upheld the Presidential Recordings 
 
New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1559 (2d Cir. 1983); Denver Policemen’s Protective 
Ass’n v. Lichtenstein, 660 F.2d 432, 435 (10th Cir. 1981); Fadjo v. Coon, 633 
F.2d 1172, 1175 (5th Cir. Jan. 1981); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. 
Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980). But see Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., 
AFL–CIO v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 118 F.3d 786, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
(“The Supreme Court has addressed the issue in recurring dicta without, we 
believe, resolving it.”); J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1088–90 (6th Cir. 1981) 
(rejecting a constitutional right to nondisclosure of personal information). 
 128. 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
 129. See id. at 591. 
 130. Id. at 593–95. 
 131. Id. at 598–600. 
 132. Id. at 600. 
 133. Id. at 605–06. 
 134. Id. at 597–605.  
 135. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977). 
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and Materials Preservation Act, under which President Nixon 
was forced to turn over his official records for archivists to 
screen them, returning to him materials that were “personal 
and private in nature” and determining terms and conditions 
for eventual public access to the other materials.136  
Nixon had challenged the Act’s constitutionality based in 
part on his right to privacy in the materials under the First, 
Fourth, and Fifth Amendments.137 The Court acknowledged the 
privacy interest in nondisclosure, citing Whalen,138 and Nixon’s 
“legitimate expectation of privacy in his personal communica-
tions,”139 but concluded his privacy interests were outweighed in 
the circumstances by the public’s interest in the documents and 
by his status as a public figure.140 The Court also noted that his 
claim related “only to a very small fraction of the massive vol-
ume of official materials with which they [were] . . . commin-
gled”;141 thus Nixon lacked an expectation of privacy in the ma-
jority of the materials. Also weighing against his claim was the 
fact that segregating the materials without screening was a 
“virtual impossibility,” and the Act provided procedures to min-
imize the intrusion.142 Although the Court did not find a merito-
rious claim in Nixon’s case, the Court’s balancing approach 
gave credence to a privacy right in nondisclosure. 
In 2011, in NASA v. Nelson,143 the Supreme Court recalled 
the Whalen and Nixon line of cases, but again held there was 
no violation of a constitutional right to privacy in the case at 
hand. Contract employees at NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
claimed that two parts of forms used for background checks vio-
lated their right to informational privacy—specifically, a sec-
tion of a form that asked employees about treatment or coun-
seling for recent illegal drug use and certain open-ended 
questions on a form sent to the employee’s references.144  
 
 136. Id. at 429–30. 
 137. Id. at 455. 
 138. Id. at 457 (“One element of privacy has been characterized as ‘the in-
dividual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters . . . .’” (quoting 
Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599)). 
 139. Id. at 465. 
 140. Id.  
 141. Id. at 459. 
 142. Id. at 465 (noting the “unblemished record of the archivists for discre-
tion”). 
 143. NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746 (2011). 
 144. Id. at 752–53 (detailing one form that asked if the reference had “any 
reason to question the employee’s honesty or trustworthiness,” and if the ref-
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In discussing the claimed privacy right, the Court 
acknowledged that “[i]n two cases decided more than 30 years 
ago, this Court referred broadly to a constitutional privacy ‘in-
terest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters’” and had since 
“said little else on the subject.”145 While many lower courts had 
addressed the issue in the interim,146 the Court acknowledged 
that its own case law had been sparse: “[a] few opinions have 
mentioned the concept in passing and in other contexts, [b]ut 
no other decision has squarely addressed a constitutional right 
to informational privacy.”147 The Court then assumed without 
deciding that “the Constitution protects a privacy right of the 
sort mentioned in Whalen and Nixon”—and held that “whatev-
er the scope of this interest,” the challenged portions of the 
government background check, subject to the Privacy Act’s 
safeguards against public disclosure and as part of the govern-
ment’s reasonable management of its internal affairs as em-
ployer, did not violate that right.148 Perhaps because the Court 
has “proceed[ed] with caution” where it has only “scarce and 
open-ended guideposts of substantive due process to show [it] 
the way,”149 the Court has left open the broader issues concern-
ing informational privacy and its purpose. As Justice Scalia 
lamented, by repeatedly assuming the right without deciding it, 
“the Court actually applies a constitutional informational pri-
vacy standard without giving a clue as to the rule of law it is 
applying.”150  
Scholarly conceptions of privacy have added depth and con-
text that aid in understanding the values or purpose being 
served in the Court’s privacy jurisprudence. One mapping of 
 
erence had “any adverse information concerning the employee’s violations of 
the law, financial integrity, abuse of alcohol and/or drugs, mental or emotional 
stability, general behavior, or conduct or other matters” (citations omitted) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)). 
 145. Id. at 751, 756 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599–600 (1977); 
Nixon, 433 U.S. at 457)).  
 146. Id. at 756 n.9 (“Many courts hold that disclosure of at least some kinds 
of personal information should be subject to a test that balances the govern-
ment’s interests against the individual’s interest in avoiding disclosure. The 
Sixth Circuit has held that the right to informational privacy protects only in-
trusions upon interests that can be deemed fundamental or implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty. The D.C. Circuit has expressed grave doubts about 
the existence of a constitutional right to informational privacy.” (citations 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also supra note 127.  
 147. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 756 (citations omitted). 
 148. Id. at 751, 756–57. 
 149. Id. at 757 n.10 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 150. Id. at 768 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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privacy literature, from Daniel Solove, identifies six general 
types or understandings of privacy, with some overlap: (1) a 
right to be let alone (Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’s in-
fluential formulation); (2) limited access to self; (3) secrecy or 
concealment of certain matters; (4) control over personal infor-
mation or information about oneself; (5) personhood (protection 
of one’s personality, individuality, dignity); and (6) intimacy.151 
Another categorization, from Helen Nissenbaum, identifies two 
common approaches in the literature: privacy as a constraint 
on access and privacy as a form of control.152 One might under-
stand these approaches as corresponding to, or supporting, an 
interest in the nondisclosure of information and an interest in 
decisional autonomy, which serve various values such as liber-
ty, selfhood, democracy, innovation, space for intimate rela-
tions, and social welfare.153 The idea driving many of these 
identified values is that privacy allows people to explore, inno-
vate, and make personal choices in a certain sphere to which 
they control access and without fear that they might be viewed 
as unconventional or unpopular and face reprisals, ridicule, or 
denial of benefits.154  
A few scholars have conceived of privacy in a way that ex-
plicitly includes groups or organizations, either envisioning 
group privacy as an analogue to individual privacy or an exten-
sion of it. Alan Westin’s definition notably included the privacy 
 
 151. SOLOVE, supra note 13, at 13. Solove has argued that these concep-
tions are each either too narrow or too broad because of their failure to include 
or exclude matters we typically view as private. Id. at 37. Solove has thus 
tried to shift focus away from the term “privacy” and instead toward specific 
activities that pose privacy problems, taking a pluralistic approach rather 
than searching for a unified concept based on core characteristics. Id. at 39–
40. 
 152. HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, 
AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 69–70 (2010); see also ALLEN, supra note 
13, at 34 (blending ideas of the access and control views); WESTIN, supra note 
20, at 7 (illustrating the control view by defining privacy as “the claim of indi-
viduals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to 
what extent information about them is communicated to others”); Ruth 
Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 423 (1980) (illus-
trating the access view by defining privacy as relating to “our concern over our 
accessibility to others”). 
 153. E.g., NISSENBAUM, supra note 152, at 74–75; SOLOVE, supra note 13, 
at 12, 78–80, 98. 
 154. NISSENBAUM, supra note 152, at 75, 77. Some scholars like Solove 
contend, however, that as a descriptive matter, there is no unitary or over-
arching value that privacy law protects; rather, “[t]he value of privacy in a 
particular context depends upon the social importance of the activities it facili-
tates.” SOLOVE, supra note 13, at 10, 98. 
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of “individuals, groups, or institutions.”155 He viewed privacy in 
terms of social limitation or control and argued that, like indi-
viduals, organizations have a parallel need to “decide when and 
to what extent their acts and decisions should be made pub-
lic.”156 Westin argued that organizational privacy is more than 
“the collective privacy rights of the members as individuals” 
and that it is required to enable groups to “play the role of in-
dependent and responsible agents . . . in democratic societies,” 
such as fulfilling needs for affiliation, group expression, opera-
tion of private enterprise, and criticism of government poli-
cies.157  
Edward Bloustein subsequently identified a need to devel-
op a theoretical framework of group privacy, which he referred 
to as the “‘right to huddle.’”158 Bloustein’s seminal work, Indi-
vidual & Group Privacy, attempted to provide such a frame-
work by discussing the marital relationship, lawyer-client rela-
tionships, the physician-patient privilege, political and social 
organizations, business organizations, and governmental or-
ganizations.159 According to Bloustein, group privacy is an ex-
tension of individual privacy—protecting individuals’ need to 
come together and act in concert to attain their objectives.160 
“‘Group privacy’ is an attribute of individuals in association 
 
 155. WESTIN, supra note 20, at 7. 
 156. Id. at 42. 
 157. Id. 
 158. BLOUSTEIN, supra note 12, at 123. Some sociologists have also defined 
privacy to include groups. See AMITAI ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY 196 
(1999) (privacy is “the realm in which an actor (either a person or a group, 
such as a couple) can legitimately act without disclosure and accountability to 
others”); SOLOVE, supra note 13, at 23; Arnold Simmel, Privacy Is Not an Iso-
lated Freedom, in NOMOS XIII: PRIVACY 71, 81 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. 
Chapman eds., 1971) (“We become what we are not only by establishing 
boundaries around ourselves but also by a periodic opening of these bounda-
ries to nourishment, to learning, and to intimacy. But the opening of a bound-
ary of the self may require a boundary farther out, a boundary around the 
group to which we are opening ourselves.”); Ernest van den Haag, On Privacy, 
in NOMOS XIII: PRIVACY, supra at 149. 
 159. BLOUSTEIN, supra note 12, at 123–86 (discussing the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments, trade secret law, and statutory protections such as the trade 
secret exemption of FOIA, to identify the underlying principles that corpora-
tions constitute a barrier to statism and must be able to maintain trade se-
crets to compete with each other, and that many statutes requiring disclosure 
invade group privacy in the interest of protecting the public). 
 160. Id. at 125. “The right to be let alone protects the integrity and the dig-
nity of the individual. The right to associate with others in confidence—the 
right of privacy in one’s associations—assures the success and integrity of the 
group purpose.” Id. at 181. 
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with one another within a group, rather than an attribute of 
the group itself.”161  
Neither Westin nor Bloustein specifically analyzed wheth-
er corporations could claim a right to privacy under the U.S. 
Constitution. But their work is foundational in describing 
group privacy and explaining that it serves multiple functions. 
It can serve to vindicate the privacy interests of individuals 
that exist without regard to their relationship to the organiza-
tion, or to vindicate privacy interests of individuals that relate 
to the existence of the organization. Presumably, a group right 
to privacy may also serve a mixture of these functions—
protecting a religious organization, for example, might protect 
each member’s privacy in free exercise as well as protecting 
members’ privacy in pursuing this activity in collective form. 
In sum, while the Supreme Court and the privacy litera-
ture have not coalesced around a singular definition of privacy 
or its purpose, the Court has identified two privacy interests—
an interest in making certain decisions without government in-
terference and an interest in avoiding disclosure of personal in-
formation—and we can understand these as informed by the 
values that privacy scholars have identified and the notion that 
group privacy may protect privacy in one’s associations in an 
individual and collective sense. 
B. SHOULD THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY EXTEND TO CORPORATIONS? 
The next analytical step is to examine whether it would 
serve the purpose of the privacy right to provide it to corpora-
tions. To be consistent with the fundamental rationale for ex-
tending corporations rights, as discussed in Part II.A, this re-
quires an understanding of corporate dynamics and the 
participants involved in the corporation, rather than a reified 
concept or metaphor for the corporation.162 This keeps the focus 
on carrying out the purpose of the right and granting a corpo-
rate right only when it would actually protect human inter-
ests.163 
 
 161. Id. at 124. 
 162. See supra Part II; see also Pollman, supra note 77. 
 163. For a discussion of reification versus decomposing the firm into vari-
ous participant groups, see WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 
AND FINANCE 117–18 (2010) (“[R]eification is a device for making something 
that is in fact complex seem simple, and that can be dangerous. In reality, only 
individuals enjoy the benefits, or bear the burdens and the responsibilities, of 
actions affecting other individuals.”). 
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As soon as one opens the hood to look at the corporation, 
one confronts the reality that corporations come in a variety of 
types, not necessarily resembling each other. Coca-Cola, The 
New York Times, the American Civil Liberties Union, a small 
family-run company, a church, and a small charity group are 
all, or might be, corporations. Line drawing between corpora-
tions is a challenge the Supreme Court has often avoided or re-
fused, such as in Citizens United v. FEC,164 but the significant 
variation in the purpose and dynamics of corporations necessi-
tates more nuanced analysis because the purpose of a constitu-
tional right may not be served by according it to all corpora-
tions. 
Given this significant variation between corporations and 
the need for an organizing schema, this section divides its 
analysis between (1) public corporations and (2) private and 
nonprofit corporations. This organization is not meant to sug-
gest that any of these categories should be broadly accorded 
rights. Rather it reflects a rough, but potentially meaningful 
way of starting the analysis. It separates public corporations, 
which generally have a business purpose and thousands of peo-
ple involved in distinct roles, from nonprofit and private corpo-
rations, which may have more wide-ranging purposes, sizes, 
and roles. Further, in this latter category of private and non-
profit corporations, the connection between the individuals and 
the corporation may be much closer than in the case of public 
corporations, the dynamics may resemble an association, and 
the purpose of the corporation may be more likely to implicate 
privacy values.165 Thus, each section below analyzes the corpo-
rate dynamics and participants involved in the type of corpora-
tion—public, private or nonprofit—to determine whether any 
 
 164. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (ruling broadly as to 
all corporations). 
 165. Regarding the terminology of this categorization, all states recognize 
that corporations may be for-profit or nonprofit. Anup Malani & Eric A. Pos-
ner, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 VA. L. REV. 2017, 2024 (2007). With-
in the for-profit category, corporations may be public or private. The line be-
tween these is generally understood as referring to whether the company is 
publicly reporting under federal securities regulations—not to whether, in a 
theoretical sense, the corporation has public or private dimensions. See, e.g., 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(g), 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(1) (2012) (defining 
when an issuer of securities must register such securities with the Securities 
and Exchange Commission); 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (2014) (defining when an 
issuer of securities is exempt from the registration requirement of section 
12(g)); KLEIN ET AL., supra note 163, at 106 (referring to “‘public’ corpora-
tions—that is, large firms with many shareholders and with active trading of 
shares”).  
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people likely have a privacy interest at stake and whether the 
purpose of the privacy right would be served by derivatively ac-
cording it to the corporation.166 
1. Public Corporations 
Public corporations have shareholders, directors and offic-
ers, as well as other stakeholders, such as employees and cus-
tomers. As explained below, there is little possibility of a cog-
nizable privacy interest at stake that would justify granting 
public corporations a constitutional right to privacy. 
a. Shareholders 
The privacy interests of shareholders in public corporations 
are not likely implicated by disclosures of corporate information 
or the decisions or activities the corporation engages in. The 
reasons for this are in the very nature of the relationship be-
tween shareholders, managers, and the public corporation. 
Public corporations have large-scale, dispersed, passive in-
vestment.167 Corporate assets are held by the corporation, not 
the shareholders.168 Stock ownership provides limited rights. 
Shareholders have the right to the residual interest in the firm 
and they have certain voting rights—the right to elect the 
board of directors and to vote on a few fundamental issues, 
such as merger or dissolution.169 Although corporate scholars 
 
 166. Looking at the categories of participants involved in the corporation is 
a way to systematically analyze in a theoretical setting whether any people 
behind the corporation have privacy interests at stake. It is not meant to reify 
the categories themselves or suggest an exact equivalence between the corpo-
ration’s interests and the interests of each of its individual participants in all 
respects. Cf. DAN-COHEN, supra note 107, at 64 (“[T]he organization serves as 
a kind of ‘moral buffer’: harming the organization is not exhaustively reducible 
to the harming of particular individuals.”). 
 167. For a classic work documenting the shift by the early twentieth centu-
ry of shareholders from owners to passive investors, see ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. 
& GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 
1–7 (1932). 
 168. Margaret M. Blair, Locking In Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved 
for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 391 
(2003). Economists and corporate law scholars have argued that shareholders 
cannot meaningfully be conceived of as “owners” of the firm as they own stock, 
not the corporation itself. See Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the The-
ory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 288 (1980); Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-
So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1191 
(2002). 
 169. HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 11, 288–89 
(1996) (stating that voting “is not to provide a means for conveying the pa-
trons’ preferences to the firm’s management, but rather to make it more diffi-
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have long debated the locus of power in a firm, as a practical 
matter it is uncontroversial that shareholders do not have ef-
fective control of the operations of the firm or authority to act 
on behalf of the corporation; management authority is statuto-
rily vested in the board.170 
In light of these basic premises, shareholders of public cor-
porations do not expect to be active participants in the busi-
ness.171 In fact, shareholders are often too dispersed and nu-
merous to exercise even their limited voting rights in a 
meaningful way.172 Further, public companies have liquid 
shares and shareholders may exit; share ownership may be 
short-term.173 As such, public corporations cannot be identified 
with a single, lasting group of individual shareholders. Moreo-
ver, many shareholders are actually organizations—
institutional investors such as banks, pension funds, mutual 
funds, etc.174 Individual claimants whose money is invested are 
second-order investors and commonly have diversified portfoli-
os.175 These individuals might not even disclose their names to 
the companies, whose registers would show the stock as held by 
the organization.176  
In this way, one would expect most shareholders to be un-
attached to the public corporation except as to an indirect and 
often diversified economic interest. One way of thinking about 
this might be through the lens of the “shareholder wealth max-
imization norm,” which maintains that the purpose of the firm 
is to maximize shareholder wealth and shareholders are gener-
ally assumed to have a homogenous economic interest in the 
firm.177 Under this view, shareholders would only care about 
 
cult for the firm to exploit those patrons as a class . . . . [t]o give the electorate 
some crude protection from gross opportunism on the part of those in power.”).  
 170. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2014); see also KLEIN ET AL., supra 
note 163, at 110, 123. 
 171. KLEIN ET AL., supra note 163, at 106. 
 172. HANSMANN, supra note 169, at 11. 
 173. KLEIN ET AL., supra note 163, at 109 no. 6. 
 174. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of 
Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 447–51 (1991) (discuss-
ing the rise of institutional investors). 
 175. See Jill E. Fisch, Securities Intermediaries and the Separation of Own-
ership from Control, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 877, 879–83 (2010) (“Most institu-
tional investors are highly diversified, enabling them to reduce or eliminate 
the effect of firm-specific risk on their overall returns.”). 
 176. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, The Hanging Chads of Corporate 
Voting, 96 GEO. L.J. 1227, 1236–38 (2008). 
 177. HANSMANN, supra note 169, at 288 (“[I]n virtually all cases the group 
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corporate disclosures that resulted in economic harm to the 
firm, and their concerns would be solely economic in nature. As 
the purpose of a constitutional privacy right is not to serve such 
an economic function, shareholders’ privacy interests would not 
be implicated in public corporations or by corporate actions.  
And, even if one were to take a different view—that share-
holders do not have homogenous interests in the public corpo-
ration and its purpose is not shareholder wealth maximiza-
tion—the fact would still remain that corporate law does not 
treat shareholders as “owners” or “principals” with the ability 
to control corporate operations,178 and shareholders have lim-
ited opportunities for participating in public corporations in a 
way that might implicate their privacy interests. 
More specifically, as far as information flows, because 
shareholders are not active participants in the business, they 
typically do not provide or create information in their limited 
involvement that would implicate privacy interests. Sharehold-
ers may vote on particular matters and thus may transmit 
their decisions on those issues, but they are not of a personal or 
intimate nature. This would typically be as straightforward as 
a “yea” or “nay” vote on a fundamental corporate change, such 
as a merger or the election of the board of directors. Sharehold-
ers could also submit a proposal for a particular corporate ac-
tion to be voted on with the company’s proxy materials if the 
proposal meets certain requirements.179 Common topics for 
shareholder proposals are changes to corporate governance, 
such as majority voting, or corporate social responsibility is-
sues, such as human rights.180 Even if a shareholder bought 
stock to try to advance a social or political purpose, however, 
the shareholder would still typically be an organization such as 
PETA or an institutional investor and the goal would generally 
be to raise public awareness and thereby pressure corporate 
management, not to keep the proposal private.181  
 
of individuals to whom ownership is given is extremely homogenous in its in-
terests.”). 
 178. See Lynn A. Stout, New Thinking on “Shareholder Primacy” 11 (UCLA 
Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 11-04, 2011), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1763944. 
 179. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2014). 
 180. Lee Harris, The Politics of Shareholder Voting, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1761, 1769–70 (2011). 
 181. Paul Rose, Common Agency and the Public Corporation, 63 VAND. L. 
REV. 1355, 1368 (2010). 
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The only situation of shareholder interaction that might 
implicate privacy interests would be “behind-the-scenes” 
shareholder activism. This scenario typically involves an insti-
tutional investor making a shareholder proposal and engaging 
in private negotiations with corporate management.182 In a 
sense, the interaction resembles Bloustein’s description of 
group privacy as protecting a need to come together and act in 
concert to attain group objectives.183 Yet, the shareholder in this 
instance is usually an institutional investor,184 and one would 
be hard-pressed to locate a human involved with any aware-
ness of a privacy interest at stake. Further, it is common prac-
tice for corporations to consult the SEC concerning whether 
proposals may be excluded from the corporate proxy. Thus, 
while the shareholder might seek confidential negotiations to 
further group objectives, the shareholder would not reasonably 
expect privacy given that the corporation itself, as represented 
by directors or officers, might voluntarily disclose information 
concerning the interaction to the government.185  
Thus, in view of the very limited opportunities for partici-
pation and information exchange, it is highly unlikely that pub-
lic company shareholders would create or be privy to infor-
mation of a type that would implicate privacy protection.  
b. Directors and Officers 
Directors and officers present a somewhat closer ques-
tion.186 Both directors and executive officers make high-level de-
 
 182. Id.; see also Willard T. Carleton et al., The Influence of Institutions on 
Corporate Governance Through Private Negotiations: Evidence from TIAA-
CREF, 53 J. FIN. 1335, 1335 (1998) (reviewing private negotiations between 
TIAA-CREF and firms in its portfolio during the 1992–1996 period). 
 183. See BLOUSTEIN, supra note 12, at 140–46. 
 184. Shareholder Activism, ROCK CTR. FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Apr. 
28, 2012), https://rockcenter.law.stanford.edu/videos/shareholder-activism 
(providing a detailed account of shareholder activism and the institutional in-
vestors who are involved). 
 185. Regarding information flow in the other direction, shareholders re-
ceive information that is widely disseminated in the public markets, and 
shareholders generally have the right under state corporation codes to investi-
gate the corporation’s records for a “proper purpose.” See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 8, § 220 (2014), http://delcode.delaware.gov/title8/c001/sc07/index.shtml. 
Proper purposes for investigation are limited to those related to the share-
holders’ interest in the firm. Id. Again, this is unlikely to implicate sharehold-
er privacy interests. 
 186. Many directors and officers are, of course, also shareholders; this 
analysis considers privacy interests rooted in their primary role as directors or 
officers. 
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cisions for the corporation and have information about them-
selves made public.187 The public disclosure of director and ex-
ecutive names, ages, employment history, and in some instanc-
es compensation packages, is mandated by federal securities 
regulations.188 In addition to specific line-item disclosure re-
quirements, the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 include “gap-filling” rules that require the 
disclosure of any further “material” information necessary to 
make the required statements not misleading.189 Underlying 
these disclosure obligations is a policy concern for protecting 
investors and promoting market integrity.190 
While most of the information disclosed about officers and 
directors is not of the type that would likely implicate a privacy 
right,191 one potential exception to this is the disclosure of direc-
tor or officer health information. This example made media 
headlines in recent years with news of Steve Jobs’s health and 
questions about whether Apple Inc. had to disclose otherwise 
private health information regarding its board member and 
chief executive officer.192 Jobs was not the only example in this 
 
 187. For a discussion of the roles of directors and officers, see KLEIN ET AL., 
supra note 163, at 116, 135–37; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group 
Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 5 (2002); Don-
ald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and 
the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. 
L.J. 797, 801–04 (2001). 
 188. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 
2010, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2012) (requiring corporations to disclose additional in-
formation regarding executive compensation in their annual proxy statement); 
17 C.F.R. §§ 229.401–404 (2013). Other information about executives that 
must be publicly disclosed includes involvements in bankruptcy proceedings 
and criminal convictions. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Personal Facts About 
Executive Officers: A Proposal for Tailored Disclosures To Encourage Reasona-
ble Investor Behavior, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 749, 755–59 (2007). 
 189. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.408(a), 240.12b-20 (2013). 
 190. See, e.g., Geoffrey A. Manne, The Hydraulic Theory of Disclosure Reg-
ulation and Other Costs of Disclosure, 58 ALA. L. REV. 473, 479–80, 480 n.25 
(2007); Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclo-
sure System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1, 9 (1983). For criticism of mandatory disclosure, 
see, for example, Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Dis-
closure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 692–96 (1984). 
 191. See Victoria L. Schwartz, Disclosing Corporate Disclosure Policies, 40 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 487, 496–97, 497 n.34 (noting the distinction between loss 
of privacy and infringement upon a right to privacy). 
 192. For an argument that the SEC should impose a rule requiring disclo-
sure of medical information about a “luminary” that is material to the corpora-
tion, see Allan Horwich, When the Corporate Luminary Becomes Seriously Ill: 
When Is a Corporation Obligated To Disclose that Illness and Should the Secu-
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regard; other instances of a key executive falling ill have raised 
the same issue of whether it must be publicly disclosed.193 
Google co-founder Sergey Brin has even preemptively an-
nounced that he has a gene mutation that increases his likeli-
hood of contracting Parkinson’s disease.194  
To date, the SEC has not provided specific guidance about 
whether and when disclosures of executives’ personal health 
conditions are required, and commentators’ views on this topic 
have varied.195 The key determination is whether the infor-
mation is “material”—that is, whether “there is a substantial 
likelihood that a reasonable investor would attach importance” 
to the information in making an investment decision.196 A court 
could find that personal information about an executive is ma-
terial, such as a serious illness that would affect their ability to 
do their job.197 Scholars have also discussed the possibility that 
other personal information could be material due to its impact 
on an executive’s job performance or because it reflects an ex-
ecutive’s integrity and values such as “a possible criminal pros-
ecution,”198 “a messy divorce, extramarital affairs, legal difficul-
ties, addictions, and various problems with a child.”199 Further, 
where an executive is iconic or has a reputation especially tied 
to the corporate brand, personal facts about that executive are 
 
rities and Exchange Commission Adopt a Rule Requiring Disclosure?, 5 N.Y.U. 
J.L. & BUS. 827 (2009). 
 193. See id. at 829–30 (discussing instances involving the CEOs of Time 
Warner, Inc., McDonald’s Corp., Kraft Foods, Inc., and Bear Stearns & Co.). 
 194. Miguel Helft, Google Co-founder Has Genetic Code Linked to Parkin-
son’s, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/19/ 
technology/19google.html. 
 195. For academic proposals on this topic, see Patricia Sánchez Abril & 
Ann M. Olazábal, The Celebrity CEO: Corporate Disclosure at the Intersection 
of Privacy and Securities Law, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1545 (2010); Heminway, su-
pra note 188, at 789–802; Horwich, supra note 192, at 862–70; Tom C.W. Lin, 
Executive Trade Secrets, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 911 (2012); Tom C.W. Lin, 
Undressing the CEO: Disclosing Private, Material Matters of Public Company 
Executives, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 383 (2009); Schwartz, supra note 191; Alexis 
Brown Stokes, An Apple a Day Keeps Shareholder Suits at Bay: An Examina-
tion of a Corporate Officer’s Legal Duty to Disclose Health Problems to Share-
holders, 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 303 (2011). 
 196. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.405, 240.12b-2 (2013); Heminway, supra note 188, at 
756–57. 
 197. See Jayne W. Barnard, Sovereign Prerogatives, 21 J. CORP. L. 307, 
323–25 (1996) (discussing the potential materiality of a CEO’s serious illness); 
Heminway, supra note 188, at 757 (same). 
 198. Heminway, supra note 188, at 759, 763. 
 199. Schwartz, supra note 191, at 490. 
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more likely to be material.200 A few notable corporate luminar-
ies have identities that have been particularly intertwined with 
that of a public corporation, such as Bill Gates, Steve Jobs, 
Martha Stewart, and Google co-founders Larry Page and Ser-
gey Brin. Although the public corporation is composed of a 
complex set of relationships and individuals, corporations with 
luminaries like these are in the position of having individuals 
whose reputations are directly linked to the corporate image.201  
Thus, the executive health example shows that a corporate 
right to privacy could support cognizable human interests. That 
is, if the corporation can successfully claim a privacy right, its 
executives might be able to keep their health information pri-
vate from the public. Protecting an executive’s personal infor-
mation might help ensure that highly qualified individuals 
seek executive positions and that they can work effectively, 
without worries about compelled disclosure of personal infor-
mation.202 Further, health information conceivably fits within 
various conceptions of privacy discussed above, such as the Su-
preme Court’s recognition of a privacy interest in the nondis-
closure of information. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s first case 
discussing the privacy interest in nondisclosure, Whalen, in-
volved personal health information.203 In denying the claim 
there, the Court specifically relied on the fact that the statute 
 
 200. Heminway, supra note 188, at 763; cf. Schwartz, supra note 191, at 
512–16 (providing examples of corporate disclosure and nondisclosure of exec-
utives’ personal information). 
 201. For instance, when Martha Stewart’s company went public, the pro-
spectus warned investors that the corporation was “‘highly dependent’” on one 
individual, Stewart, as “‘the personification of our brands as well as our senior 
executive and primary creative force.’” The Cult of Personality vs. Needs of the 
Market; Martha Stewart, the Company, Is Poised To Go Public. But Is It a 
Good Thing?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/10/12/ 
business/cult-personality-vs-needs-market-martha-stewart-company-poised 
-go-public-but-it.html. Commentators noted the company was based entirely 
on Stewart and questioned whether the company would suffer severely if she 
were “hit by a bus—or by a scandal.” Id. Indeed, five years later when Stewart 
became embroiled in an insider trading investigation and served a ten-month 
sentence for making false statements and obstructing the investigation, the 
company suffered financially along with its founder’s personal legal woes. See 
United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 273 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. 
Stewart, 305 F. Supp. 2d 368, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Geraldine Szott Moohr, 
What the Martha Stewart Case Tells Us About White Collar Criminal Law, 43 
HOUS. L. REV. 591, 594–97 (2006) (discussing the repercussions to Stewart’s 
company from the investigation of her trade and subsequent conviction). 
 202. Heminway, supra note 188, at 774. 
 203. For a discussion of Whalen, see supra text accompanying notes 128–
34. 
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in question provided for securely maintaining the information, 
only providing it to a small number of public health officials, 
and preventing its public disclosure. That would not be the case 
in the instance of executive health information because if the 
SEC were to require disclosure due to the information’s mate-
riality to the investing public it would by definition make the 
information public. Furthermore, the government interest in 
such a disclosure would arguably be less than it was in Whalen 
where the statute concerned the state’s interest in controlling 
the distribution of dangerous drugs.  
The executive health example also shows why an individu-
al may not be able to fully vindicate her privacy interests in an 
individual capacity. Various laws protect some aspects of indi-
vidual privacy. For instance, the Americans with Disabilities 
Act of 1990 (ADA) may preclude some disclosures about 
health,204 FOIA contains a “personal privacy” exemption,205 and 
the Privacy Act bars disclosure of records held by government 
entities without the prior written consent of the individual to 
whom the record pertains.206 But in circumstances where feder-
al securities laws require corporate disclosure and this patch-
work of protections does not cover the information, the individ-
ual may not be able to keep the information to herself unless 
the corporation can vindicate the right. That is, requiring af-
fected individuals to come forward in their own names would 
undermine the very interest they would be trying to protect. 
On the other hand, as it is the information of just one iden-
tifiable person, it is not clear that the corporation itself would 
have to be accorded the right so long as it could assert the right 
on behalf of the affected individual.207 Moreover, the example 
also demonstrates that directors and executive officers of public 
corporations are public figures, and competing interests may 
exist amongst participants in the corporation that could weigh 
against according the corporation a right. When people assume 
certain top-ranking positions within a public corporation, they 
 
 204. See Horwich, supra note 192, at 832–33 (noting that the contours of 
the conflict between the securities disclosure regime and the ADA are not well 
understood). 
 205. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2012). Under the Court’s recent ruling, indi-
viduals but not corporations may claim the “personal privacy” exemption. FCC 
v. AT&T, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1185 (2011). 
 206. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012). The Privacy Act does not 
include the corporation in its definition of “individual.” Id. § 552a(a)(2). 
 207. For a discussion of third party standing and its limitations, see Gar-
rett, supra note 103. 
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know that means certain information about themselves will be-
come public. Corporate icons like Steve Jobs are especially 
identifiable as public figures, and the very reason why they 
might have to disclose health information is because they are 
viewed as so integral to the corporation’s success that it would 
be considered material to a reasonable investor.208 Although 
most directors and officers do not receive such a high level of 
public attention and may not be luminaries about whom such 
extensive information would be disclosed, their high-level posi-
tions in public corporations lessen their reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy in information relevant to their involvement in 
the corporation.209 Further, the tension between privacy and 
disclosure arises in this instance from the competing interests 
of the corporate participants themselves—officers/directors and 
shareholders. Disclosure generally serves shareholder interests 
by promoting investor protection and market integrity. For the-
se reasons, officers and directors present a closer question, but 
would likely fail to demonstrate a cognizable constitutional pri-
vacy interest that would justify granting public corporations a 
right to privacy. 
c. Employees and Other Stakeholders  
Employees in public corporations, apart from executive of-
ficers, are typically further from the core of the corporation’s 
decision making and any critical information that might impli-
cate privacy interests. Public corporations often employ thou-
sands of individuals and the employee ranks change frequently.  
Furthermore, in many legal contexts, employee interests 
actually stand in conflict with those of the employing corpora-
tion. For instance, the privacy rights of the employee are often 
set against employers’ business justifications for monitoring 
 
 208. See Horwich, supra note 192, at 827–33. 
 209. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, 
126 HARV. L. REV. 2010, 2014 (2013) (“[P]rivacy protections for people volun-
tarily in the public eye in the United States are basically negligible.” (citing 
Scott J. Shackelford, Fragile Merchandise: A Comparative Analysis of the Pri-
vacy Rights for Public Figures, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 125, 147 (2012))); cf. Nixon v. 
Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 465 (1977) (“In sum, appellant has a legit-
imate expectation of privacy in his personal communications. But the constitu-
tionality of the Act must be viewed in the context of the limited intrusion of 
the screening process, of appellant’s status as a public figure . . . .”). 
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employees.210 This creates some dissonance with the idea of de-
riving a privacy right for corporations from their employees.  
Other stakeholders in the public corporation are also in a 
position too attenuated to support a derivative corporate priva-
cy right. A stakeholder, broadly speaking, is a party that can 
affect or be affected by the corporation’s actions.211 As with em-
ployees, in many legal contexts the stakeholder’s interests ac-
tually stand in conflict with those of the shareholders or direc-
tors and officers. For instance, customers are often counted as 
stakeholders, and a whole area of the law deals with consumer 
privacy—laws and regulations that seek to protect consumers’ 
loss of privacy due to failures or limitations on corporate cus-
tomer privacy measures.212 Consumer privacy laws recognize 
that corporations sometimes have an opposing interest in shar-
ing consumer data for commercial advantage.213 Therefore, one 
 
 210. Corey A. Ciocchetti, Monitoring Employee E-Mail: Efficient Workplac-
es vs. Employee Privacy, 2001 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 0026, ¶¶ 1–2 (listing ex-
amples of employer monitoring that may include surveillance of employee tel-
ephone calls, the time each employee spends on bathroom breaks, and 
workplace e-mail), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent 
.cgi?article=1025&context=dltr; Alan F. Westin, Privacy in the Workplace: 
How Well Does American Law Reflect American Values?, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
271, 271 (1996). 
 211. R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER AP-
PROACH 53 (1984) (stating that a stakeholder is “any group or individual who 
can affect or is affected by the achievement of an organization’s purpose”). 
Some would define stakeholder more narrowly, such as someone having an 
asset at risk. See, e.g., Max B.E. Clarkson, A Stakeholder Framework for Ana-
lyzing and Evaluating Corporate Social Performance, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 
92, 105–07 (1995).  
 212. See, e.g., Stephen F. Ambrose, Jr. & Joseph W. Gelb, Consumer Priva-
cy Litigation and Enforcement Actions, 60 BUS. LAW. 723 (2005); J. Howard 
Beales, III & Timothy J. Muris, Choice or Consequences: Protecting Privacy in 
Commercial Information, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 109 (2008). For a discussion of 
corporations’ use of consumer data, see SIMSON GARFINKEL, DATABASE NA-
TION (2000); A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 
1461 (2000). 
 213. As privacy scholar Neil Richards has explained: 
[C]ompanies big and small generate vast fortunes from the collection, 
use, and sale of personal data. . . . “[B]ehavioral advertising” is a 
multibillion-dollar business, and is the foundation on which the suc-
cesses of companies like Google and Facebook have been built. One 
recent study concludes that this form of surveillance is so ingrained 
into the fabric of the Internet “that a small number of companies have 
a window into most of our movements online.” 
Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1938 
(2013) (footnote omitted). Further, “[g]overnment and nongovernment surveil-
lance support each other in a complex manner that is often impossible to dis-
entangle.” Id. at 1940. 
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could not assume that a corporate right would protect consum-
ers’ interests or that a corporation would assert such a right in 
defense of its customers.214 
That being said, while employees’ and stakeholders’ inter-
ests often stand in conflict with those of other corporate partic-
ipants, their interests may sometimes align vis-à-vis the gov-
ernment, and the corporation may be better situated to 
vindicate those interests. For instance, when the government 
subpoenaed Google to produce a list of URLs available through 
its site and the text of users’ search queries, questions arose 
about the privacy of Google’s users.215 The government had 
sought the information to test blocking and filtering software 
for minors.216 Google objected on a variety of bases, including 
the potential for “loss of user trust” that would harm Google’s 
business goodwill.217 The federal district court separately 
raised, sua sponte, privacy concerns about Google’s users be-
cause identifiable information may be found in text strings, and 
because of the prevalence of internet searches for sexually ex-
plicit material.218 Ultimately, the court determined it did not 
have to rule on the privacy issue in that case because it granted 
the government’s motion to compel only as to the sample URLs 
and not as to the search queries.219  
Similarly, in the recent case Amazon.com LLC v. Lay, Am-
azon disputed the North Carolina Department of Revenue’s 
demand for all in-state customer sale information as part of a 
tax investigation.220 Among other claims, Amazon asserted that 
“the privacy and First Amendment rights of itself and of its 
 
 214. See Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. 
REV. 561, 598, 600 (2009) (arguing that third-party business record holders 
can fight for their customers’ privacy rights, but acknowledging that “third 
parties in possession of business records may be willing to cooperate with the 
police” and that “recent headlines about how telecommunications providers 
voluntarily assisted the NSA in collecting third-party records (quite possibly 
in violation of statutory privacy laws) reaffirm that sometimes third-party 
providers will cooperate eagerly with the government”). 
 215. Gonzales v. Google, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 674, 677, 687–88 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
 216. Id. at 678. 
 217. Id. at 683–84. 
 218. Id. at 687. 
 219. Id. at 687–88. For a discussion of applying the First Amendment in 
the criminal procedure context, such as to subpoenas for book records or 
search query data that implicate First Amendment activities, see Daniel J. 
Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112, 
166–76 (2007). 
 220. Amazon.com LLC v. Lay, 758 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1154–55 (W.D. Wash. 
2010). 
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customers” would be violated by forcing it to disclose personal 
identifiers.221 Represented by the ACLU, Amazon customers in-
tervened anonymously in the suit, alleging their own First and 
Fourteenth Amendment claims.222 The court held that the 
state’s request implicated the First Amendment rights of “Am-
azon’s customers and the Intervenors,” and the state was pro-
hibited from forcing Amazon to disclose the identities and spe-
cific purchase information of its residents.223  
These cases illustrate that corporations have an important 
role to play in safeguarding their customers’ privacy interests. 
Further, the importance of this role is growing at a rapid pace, 
with the increasing pervasiveness of corporations storing the 
personal data of customers and users.224 But customers’ inter-
ests are generally too attenuated or divergent from a corpora-
tion’s to support a derivative privacy right for the corporation—
customers are outside the corporation—and so the rationale for 
according the right to the corporation would have to be instru-
mental.225 In that regard, a parallel might be drawn to the 
commercial speech doctrine. As discussed in Part II.A, the ra-
tionale for protecting commercial speech has not been to protect 
the speech right of the corporation as speaker or the natural 
 
 221. Id. at 1159, 1162; Complaint for Declaratory Relief Pursuant to the 
Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202 at 1, 3, Amazon.com LLC 
v. Lay, 758 F. Supp. 2d 1154 (W.D. Wash. 2010) (No. 2:10-cv-00664), available 
at http://www.acluofnorthcarolina.org/files/Amazon%20Complaint.pdf (“If Am-
azon is forced to comply with this demand, the disclosure will invade the pri-
vacy and violate the First Amendment rights of Amazon and its customers on 
a massive scale. . . . Amazon asserts the privacy and First Amendment rights 
of itself and of its customers so that Amazon may sell—and customers may 
read, hear or view—a broad range of popular and unpopular expressive mate-
rials with the customers’ private content choices protected from unnecessary 
government scrutiny.”). 
 222. Order Granting Intervenors’ Motion To Intervene and Motion To File 
Complaint in Intervention Using Pseudonyms at 4, Amazon.com LLC v. Lay, 
758 F. Supp. 2d 1154 (2010) (No. 2:10-CV-00664). 
 223. Amazon.com, 758 F. Supp. 2d at 1167–69. For a discussion of First 
Amendment “reader privacy” and the importance of “intellectual privacy,” see 
Neil M. Richards, The Perils of Social Reading, 101 GEO. L.J. 689 (2013). 
 224. See Richards, supra note 223, at 698–703; Christopher Slobogin, Gov-
ernment Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 
320–21 (2008).  
 225. Thorny issues of standing could also arise. For a discussion of various 
standing doctrines, see Garrett, supra note 103; Glenn D. Magpantay, Associa-
tional Rights and Standing: Does Citizens United Require Constitutional 
Symmetry Between the First Amendment and Article III?, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. 
& PUB. POL’Y 667 (2012); Tacy F. Flint, Comment, A New Brand of Represen-
tational Standing, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037 (2003).  
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persons behind the corporation, but rather to protect consum-
ers who have an interest in hearing the information. Similarly 
in the context of informational privacy, according protection to 
the corporation might serve to protect the customers who face 
collective action problems and who may not be willing to come 
forward or even know that their personal information is at risk 
of being disclosed.226 Such a basis for according protection to 
corporations would be narrow, however, because it would only 
exist to serve such an instrumental purpose related to custom-
ers—not a derivative right generally accorded to public corpo-
rations. At best, this might be ground for a narrow doctrine or 
elaboration of the Whalen v. Roe line of cases to address these 
concerns.227  
To sum up the analysis for public corporations, by looking 
at the various participants involved—shareholders, directors 
and officers, employees and other stakeholders—and the dy-
namics within the corporation, we see that there is little possi-
bility of a cognizable privacy interest at stake that would justi-
fy granting public corporations a constitutional right to privacy. 
The role of shareholders in public corporations is economic in 
nature and shareholders have limited opportunities to partici-
pate and exchange information in a way that would implicate 
privacy interests. Directors and officers have information about 
themselves publicly disclosed, but it is only rarely of a type that 
might give rise to privacy concerns of a constitutional dimen-
sion and it is not clear that the corporation itself would need a 
right to privacy to vindicate the privacy right of the individual. 
Further, any privacy interests of public company directors and 
officers are diminished or constrained by their status as public 
figures and shareholders’ competing interests. Employees and 
other stakeholders are typically further from the core of the 
 
 226. An example of this dynamic might be the situation faced by the nearly 
400,000 users of the company Lavabit’s encrypted e-mail service. The service 
came to national attention when the government tried to compel disclosure of 
its master encryption keys after it was revealed that Edward Snowden had a 
Lavabit account. See Jennifer Granick, Hands Off Encryption! Say New Amici 
Briefs in Lavabit Case, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 26, 2013, 12:26 PM), 
http://justsecurity.org/2013/10/26/hands-encryption-amici-briefs-lavabit-case; 
Orin Kerr, Lavabit Challenges Contempt Order in the Fourth Circuit: An 
Analysis of Its Arguments, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 11, 2013, 1:29 AM), 
http://www.volokh.com/2013/10/11/lavabit-challenges-contempt-order. 
 227. Existing doctrine might also constrain this possibility—most notably, 
the Fourth Amendment’s third party doctrine provides that information loses 
protection when knowingly revealed to a third party. See, e.g., Kerr, supra 
note 214, at 563.  
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corporation’s decision making and any critical information that 
might implicate privacy interests. Their privacy interests often 
stand in conflict with the other corporate participants, and so 
would not support a derivative right for the corporation. Corpo-
rations may have an important role to play in protecting the 
privacy of outside stakeholders, such as customers, but such an 
analysis would be limited to a more narrow, instrumental ra-
tionale for protection in that limited circumstance. All in all, 
this analysis explains in a deeper way why it is unnecessary to 
accord a constitutional right to privacy to public corporations: 
there is not a person involved who needs the corporation itself 
to hold that right in order to protect their constitutional privacy 
interests. 
2. Nonprofit and Private Corporations 
Turning now to other types of corporations besides the 
large, publicly held business corporation, we see that their pur-
poses and dynamics vary widely. This section starts with brief 
background about these other types of corporations and then 
examines the potential privacy implications in these kinds of 
corporations. This analysis keys up a fundamental question 
about the corporate form and privacy, explored in the next sec-
tion. 
Nonprofits are characterized by being subject to “the 
nondistribution constraint,” which prohibits a nonprofit from 
distributing a profit to individuals who exercise control over 
it—hence nonprofits do not have indicia of ownership or share-
holders.228 Participants include a board of directors, and poten-
tially also officers, employees, members, and donors.229 Nonprof-
it activities and size may vary widely. Nonprofits may serve the 
mutual benefit of their members or patrons, like credit unions 
and social clubs, or they may serve the public, like libraries, 
schools, and museums.230 Nonprofits range in size from organi-
 
 228. Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 
835, 838, 844 (1980) (noting that the nondistribution constraint does not pro-
hibit the nonprofit from earning a profit or paying salaries and perquisites to 
employees, rather it prohibits distributing any profit to individuals who exer-
cise control over the nonprofit). 
 229. Nonprofits may have members who elect the board of directors, but 
this is not a requirement as they can have self-perpetuating boards. Id. at 
841–42. 
 230. See id. at 840–42. Some nonprofits receive most of their income from 
donations, such as the Red Cross and Salvation Army, whereas others receive 
income by charging for their services, such as hospitals and the American Au-
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zations with billions of dollars in assets and thousands of em-
ployees, such as universities and foundations, to groups that 
have virtually no assets and just a couple of people involved.231  
Private corporations are by contrast for-profit and not sub-
ject to the non-distribution constraint. Private corporation 
structure is thus like that of public corporations with regard to 
having a board of directors, officers, and shareholders, but in 
the small private corporation the shareholders are not typically 
a vast group of dispersed investors and there may be significant 
overlap in the roles of shareholders, directors, and officers.232 
Like nonprofits, private corporations vary widely with regard to 
the size of their assets and the number of people involved. 
Some well-known examples of large private corporations are 
Cargill, Koch Industries, and Mars.233 One of the largest, Car-
gill, had over 140,000 employees and revenues over $130 billion 
in 2013.234 But most private corporations are dramatically 
smaller than these large examples and than public corpora-
tions.235 Incorporation is relatively simple and inexpensive, so 
some very small businesses are formed as corporations despite 
otherwise resembling a sole proprietorship or family busi-
ness.236  
In many instances nonprofit and private corporations may 
be like public corporations in that there is little possibility of a 
cognizable human privacy interest at stake that would be pro-
tected by granting the corporation a right to privacy. The role of 
shareholders in private corporations is economic and not likely 
 
tomobile Association. Id. Depending on their purpose, nonprofits may receive 
substantial federal and state tax benefits. See, e.g., Malani & Posner, supra 
note 165, at 2026. 
 231. See Usha Rodrigues, Entity and Identity, 60 EMORY L.J. 1257, 1261, 
1293–311 (2011). 
 232. See Harwell Wells, The Rise of the Close Corporation and the Making 
of Corporation Law, 5 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 263, 266 (2008). 
 233. See America’s Largest Private Companies, FORBES (Nov. 3, 2010), 
http://www.forbes.com/lists/2010/21/private-companies-10_rank.html. 
 234. CARGILL, http://www.cargill.com/company/glance/index.jsp (last visit-
ed Oct. 15, 2014). 
 235. See, e.g., Wells, supra note 232, at 274. 
 236. One type of private corporation, the closely held corporation, is in fact 
known by its characteristic small number of shareholders who are also often 
participants in the management, direction, and operations of the corporation, 
and by its lack of a ready market for the corporate stock. 18 C.J.S. Corpora-
tions § 9 (2007). Some closely held corporations are personal or family ven-
tures, with all of the stock held by a single family or group of friends and fami-
ly. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and 
Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271, 273–74 (1986). 
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to implicate decisional autonomy; in their role as investors they 
do not participate in the corporation in a way that generates 
personal information nor is there a requirement to publicly dis-
close their information.  
Indeed, private corporations are not required to publicly 
report under federal securities law, and therefore they are not 
subject to disclosure requirements about their directors and of-
ficers.237 Thus, even when private corporations have individuals 
who are strongly associated with the organization, such as 
Mark Zuckerberg, the famous CEO of the formerly private 
company Facebook, there is little likelihood of a privacy claim 
arising to protect their interests.  
Nonprofits are likewise not subject to public reporting un-
der federal securities law, and, as noted, by definition they do 
not have shareholders.238 Certain nonprofits, as tax-exempt or-
ganizations, must file an annual information return with the 
Internal Revenue Service.239 This annual return, Form 990, is 
intended to help the IRS detect tax abuse, and it requires a va-
riety of information including a listing of officers, directors, 
trustees, key employees, and highest compensated employees, 
and reporting of certain compensation related to such per-
sons.240 In most instances any such information that is publicly 
disclosed is not of a type that would implicate a privacy interest 
of constitutional dimension.241 
A crucial distinction exists, however, between public corpo-
rations on the one hand and some nonprofits and private corpo-
rations on the other. The nexus between the individuals in-
volved in a nonprofit or private corporation may be much closer 
than in the case of public corporations—the dynamic more as-
sociational amongst all of the participants—and the purpose of 
the nonprofit or private corporation may be in a realm more 
 
 237. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(g), 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(1)(B) 
(2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (2014). 
 238. See supra note 237. 
 239. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INSTRUCTIONS 
FOR FORM 990 RETURN OF ORGANIZATION EXEMPT FROM INCOME TAX, 3 
(2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i990.pdf. 
 240. Id. at 25; see also Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Nonprofits, Politics, and Pri-
vacy, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 801, 809 (2012) (identifying Form 990 as a 
channel through which tax-exempt organizations provide information to the 
IRS). 
 241. See Mayer, supra note 240, at 809–11 (discussing the public disclosure 
of information provided by tax-exempt organizations to the IRS and exceptions 
to such disclosure, such as information that identifies an organization’s do-
nors). 
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likely to implicate recognized privacy values—social, political, 
or religious. A public corporation typically has primarily a 
business purpose, with thousands of people involved in distinct 
roles and heterogeneous interests and motives apart from a 
general economic interest in the firm.242 By contrast, a nonprofit 
corporation may have members associating together for a pur-
pose that has traditionally been viewed as part of the private 
realm of individuals and their personal lives.243 A private corpo-
ration may have primarily a business purpose, but be entirely 
composed of shareholders, directors, and employees with family 
or marital ties.244 The corporate documents may directly reflect 
the family’s collective finances and activities, including infor-
mation about the family members’ social associations, religious 
affiliation, and political allies.  
Thus, as corporations are not monolithic organizations, one 
might imagine a spectrum—at one end there are corporations 
with characteristics that suggest individuals could be involved 
with privacy interests at stake that would be supported by a 
corporate right to privacy. The privacy interest could stem from 
the corporation being an organization that holds personal in-
formation or perhaps from the purpose or activities of the or-
ganization itself being related to a liberty or autonomy interest, 
such as a small religious or political group. Because of the 
wide-ranging variations in these sorts of organizations, and the 
indeterminacy of privacy, various factual scenarios could raise 
the potential for implicating privacy interests for the group.245  
The great bulk of these scenarios raise issues that could be 
presented as First or Fourth Amendment claims, and there is 
arguably no need to bring a right to privacy claim as such. For 
 
 242. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 243. See, e.g., Hansmann, supra note 228, at 837 (noting nonprofit institu-
tions such as social clubs and churches). 
 244. See Benjamin Means, Nonmarket Values in Family Businesses, 54 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1185, 1193–94 (2013) (arguing that “family businesses 
are an extension of family relationships”). 
 245. For example, one scholar has argued that libraries and bookstores 
might have used the right to informational privacy to challenge section 215 of 
the USA PATRIOT Act. Michael J. O’Donnell, Reading for Terrorism: Section 
215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and the Constitutional Right to Information Pri-
vacy, 31 J. LEGIS. 45, 48 (2004). The provision has stirred a great deal of con-
troversy as it allowed FBI officials to seek a court order compelling any “tangi-
ble item” relevant to counterintelligence or counterterrorism investigations, 
including book records, without notice to individuals whose records had been 
obtained. Id. at 45–47. The article did not examine whether status as a group 
or corporation would have affected the ability of libraries and bookstores to 
bring the right to privacy claim it suggested. 
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example, the ACLU recently claimed that the government vio-
lated its First and Fourth Amendment rights by requiring Ver-
izon to turn over on a daily basis the metadata of all of its cus-
tomers’ phone calls, including the metadata of all ACLU phone 
calls.246 The ACLU deputy director stated the government’s ac-
tion “represents a gross infringement of the freedom of associa-
tion and the right to privacy,”247 but the complaint itself framed 
the ACLU’s claims simply as First and Fourth Amendment vio-
lations without a specific claim to an independent right to pri-
vacy.248 
The concept of privacy is also bound up in the constitution-
al “freedom to associate,” a right that is understood to cover 
groups, including corporations.249 This right has roots in the 
First Amendment’s freedom of speech and assembly, which pro-
tect group autonomy.250 The key modern case recognizing the 
freedom to associate is NAACP v. Alabama, in which the Su-
preme Court held that state-compelled disclosure of the group’s 
membership list was invalid “as entailing the likelihood of a 
substantial restraint upon the exercise by petitioner’s members 
of their right to freedom of association.”251 In so holding, the 
Court stated that members of the nonprofit corporation had a 
right to “pursue their lawful private interests privately and to 
associate freely with others in doing so,” and it recognized “the 
 
 246. Complaint at 2, ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(No. 13 Civ. 3994), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/nsa_phone_ 
spying_complaint.pdf. 
 247. ACLU Files Lawsuit Challenging Constitutionality of NSA Phone Spy-
ing Program, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (June 11, 2013), https://www.aclu 
.org/national-security/aclu-files-lawsuit-challenging-constitutionality-nsa 
-phone-spying-program. 
 248. Complaint, supra note 246. The court held that the ACLU had stand-
ing, but that the NSA’s metadata collection did not violate the First or Fourth 
Amendment because of the third party doctrine, under which a person who 
conveys information to a third party forfeits his right to privacy in the infor-
mation. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 738, 751. 
 249. For a discussion of the history and evolution of the related and some-
times overlapping rights of freedom of association, assembly, associational 
privacy, and expressive association, see Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational 
Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978, 982–1002 (2011). See also JOHN D. INAZU, LIBER-
TY’S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY 9–10 (2012) (discussing 
the link between privacy and association in the Court’s freedom of association 
jurisprudence). 
 250. See Bhagwat, supra note 249, at 984–94. 
 251. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958). 
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vital relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in 
one’s associations.”252  
But while the concept of privacy is enmeshed in the free-
dom to associate and other rights, the right to privacy has 
evolved separately and it may not be entirely overlapping.253 
What if, for example, the government did not seek the NAACP 
membership list, but rather the donor list to the William J. 
Clinton Presidential Library Foundation? When Congress 
sought this information several years ago, nonprofits like the 
Heritage Foundation and the Southern Poverty Law Center 
protested that this was covered by the NAACP case.254 Other 
commentators pointed out this was actually unclear because 
the NAACP case relied on the rationale that the members 
would face retaliation or physical danger if the list was dis-
closed—facts that were arguably absent for the library founda-
tion.255 After Citizens United, the calls for public disclosure of 
information relating to politically active nonprofits and their 
donors have only increased.256 Some commentators have dis-
cussed this issue in terms of privacy, rather than just First 
 
 252. Id. at 462, 466. 
 253. Scholars have argued for a more robust freedom of association or right 
to assembly. For instance, John Inazu has expressed concern that the Court’s 
modern association jurisprudence takes an overly narrow view of groups that 
qualify as “expressive” and does not offer rigorous protections. See INAZU, su-
pra note 249, at 3–4. 
 254. Evelyn Brody, Entrance, Voice, and Exit: The Constitutional Bounds of 
the Right of Association, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 821, 840–41 (2002). 
 255. Id. at 841; see also Dale E. Ho, NAACP v. Alabama and False Sym-
metry in the Disclosure Debate, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 405, 412 
(2012) (arguing that, under one interpretation, the Court balanced the state’s 
interest in “monitoring corporate activity” against the harm disclosure would 
cause NAACP members). 
 256. See, e.g., Democracy is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in 
Elections Act (the DISCLOSE Act), H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. §§ 211, 301 (2010); 
S. 3295, 111th Cong. §§ 211, 301 (2010); Ellen P. Aprill, Regulating the Politi-
cal Speech of Noncharitable Exempt Organizations After Citizens United, 10 
ELECTION L.J. 363, 401–05 (2011); Donald B. Tobin, Campaign Disclosure and 
Tax-Exempt Entities: A Quick Repair to the Regulatory Plumbing, 10 ELEC-
TION L.J. 427, 439–47 (2011). In Citizens United v. FEC, the Court confirmed 
the constitutional validity of disclosure requirements with the exception of 
when a reasonable probability exists that members or supporters of a group 
would be subject to harassment or reprisals if their identities were disclosed. 
130 S. Ct. 876, 913–17 (2010); see also Richard Briffault, Two Challenges For 
Campaign Finance Disclosure After Citizens United and Doe v. Reed, 19 WM. 
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 983, 999 (2011) (discussing the Court’s disclosure juris-
prudence and the possibility of changing the standards for an exemption). 
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Amendment chilling effects or freedom of association.257 To be 
sure, competing interests could properly outweigh such a priva-
cy right, but the possibility exists that a privacy right would at 
least be implicated.258 
To raise another possibility, what if the government did 
not simply ask a nonprofit for its membership list, but instead 
infiltrated and spied on the group? The history of the FBI and 
other law enforcement engaging in this kind of surveillance is 
wide-ranging, from infiltration of political groups like the So-
cialist Worker Party to mosques and other religious organiza-
tions.259 As with the ACLU v. Clapper case, scholarship and 
case law have primarily focused on whether the surveillance 
violates the First Amendment by chilling the exercise of free 
speech or religion.260 But, what if the government also collected 
and disclosed personal information regarding the members 
without a legitimate law enforcement purpose? Depending on 
the facts at hand, the group would plausibly have a privacy 
claim. 
 
 257. See William McGeveran, Mrs. McIntyre’s Persona: Bringing Privacy 
Theory to Election Law, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 859, 861 (2011) (applying 
information privacy theory to election law); Daniel Winik, Note, Citizens In-
formed: Broader Disclosure and Disclaimer for Corporate Electoral Advocacy 
in the Wake of Citizens United, 120 YALE L.J. 622, 661–66 (2010) (arguing 
that denying corporations the right to anonymity in political speech is consti-
tutionally legitimate because “corporations lack the kind of dignitary interests 
that justify privacy for individuals”). 
 258. See Mayer, supra note 240, at 812 (discussing the Joint Committee on 
Taxation’s recognition that “tax-exempt organizations have a right to privacy,” 
but noting that the committee’s staff concluded that public interest generally 
outweighed this right); see also WESTIN, supra note 20, at 25 (“The functions of 
privacy in liberal systems do not require that it be an absolute right. The exer-
cise of privacy creates dangers for a democracy that may call for social and le-
gal responses. . . . Thus the constant search in democracies must be for the 
proper boundary line in each specific situation and for an over-all equilibrium 
that serves to strengthen democratic institutions and processes.”). 
 259. See Linda E. Fisher, Guilt By Expressive Association: Political Profil-
ing, Surveillance and the Privacy of Groups, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 621, 643 (2004) 
(discussing religious and political surveillance); David A. Harris, Law En-
forcement and Intelligence Gathering in Muslim and Immigrant Communities 
After 9/11, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 123, 132–41 (2010) (discussing 
the FBI’s use of informants in mosques and other religious institutions); 
Shirin Sinnar, Questioning Law Enforcement, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 41, 46–62 
(2011) (describing FBI and Customs and Border Patrol interviews of U.S. Mus-
lims). 
 260. See, e.g., Williams v. Price, 25 F. Supp. 2d 623, 629–30 (W.D. Pa. 
1998) (finding surveillance chilled the plaintiff’s freedom to confer with his at-
torney); Sinnar, supra note 259, at 67–71. 
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In sum, this examination suggests that, as with public cor-
porations, there is little possibility of a cognizable privacy in-
terest at stake that would justify granting nonprofit or private 
corporations a constitutional right to privacy. However, it is 
harder to rule out the possibility because some nonprofits and 
private corporations may be appropriately described as associa-
tions of people and their activity may be in a realm more likely 
to implicate recognized privacy values. To a great extent this 
analysis underscores that in most circumstances, most corpora-
tions should not be accorded a constitutional right to privacy—
and it is a stretch to find scenarios that could not be more simp-
ly characterized as freedom of association, or First or Fourth 
Amendment claims, which may provide more clearly estab-
lished grounds. But the lines between these rights are not al-
ways well delineated, and the right to privacy may play an im-
portant role for some corporations in limited contexts.261 
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE JURISPRUDENCE 
One of the key contributions of this Article is measured 
analysis explaining why most corporations in most circum-
stances should not have a claim to a constitutional right to pri-
vacy. The preceding section also raises the idea that there may 
be limited instances when some nonprofit and private corpora-
tions could have a stronger claim for constitutional privacy, and 
this puts into focus the remaining question to be explored here: 
is there something specific about the right of privacy or the 
 
 261. Little work to date has explored whether a coherent distinction can be 
drawn between allowing a group to claim the freedom to associate versus a 
right to privacy—this could be a fruitful area for exploration as they may be 
mutually supporting rights, and categorically denying all corporations a right 
to privacy could undermine associational rights. Inazu has suggested that pri-
vacy in association cases protect the boundaries of group autonomy whereas 
the right to privacy represented by Griswold serves as a guarantor of individ-
ual autonomy. INAZU, supra note 249, at 10. But there is reason to question 
this distinction as the Court has often grounded the association cases in no-
tions of protecting members, see NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 
U.S. 449, 462 (1958), and at times the Court has focused its privacy cases on 
protecting a relation, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). 
Further, a common view of the underlying motivation for group rights is sup-
port of individual autonomy, which suggests there is not always a bright line 
between supporting individual autonomy and supporting group autonomy. See 
Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Recurring Paradox of Groups in the Liberal 
State, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 47, 50–51 (2010). Linda Fisher has suggested that 
“[t]he overlapping constitutional right to informational privacy is . . . distin-
guishable [from the freedom of association] in that it focuses on protecting 
personal information from unreasonable dissemination, rather than on avoid-
ing interference with expressive activities.” Fisher, supra note 259, at 643.  
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corporate form that would foreclose all corporations from claim-
ing the right, even in the most compelling examples? This ques-
tion underlies how the Court should address cases that arise in 
this area, and more fundamentally, this question speaks to 
deeper issues that corporate rights raise.  
As a purely predictive matter, a strong possibility exists 
that the Court would categorically deny all corporations the 
constitutional right to privacy. Several indicators point in this 
direction. First, the Supreme Court’s privacy jurisprudence is a 
limited patchwork of cases that do not clearly have binding ap-
plication outside the confines of the particulars in precedent 
cases.262 That is to say, the right to privacy is a thin reed for a 
party to rely upon, arguably the recognition of a group right 
would represent an expansion of the doctrine, and jurists may 
be inclined to narrowly construe the right to avoid murky is-
sues of substantive due process.263 The Court might prefer that 
groups seek legislative action to address changing privacy con-
cerns rather than accord corporations the imprimatur of priva-
cy as a constitutional right.264 In addition, the Court has once 
referred to the right to privacy just before mentioning the 
“purely personal” framework, suggesting that it would put the 
right to privacy in the same conceptual category as the privi-
 
 262. See supra Part III.A for a discussion of Supreme Court privacy juris-
prudence. 
 263. For criticism of the Supreme Court’s privacy decisions, see, for exam-
ple, ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 95–100, 110–26, 169–70 
(1990); John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 
82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973); Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Priva-
cy by the Supreme Court, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 173 (1979).  
 264. See Michael W. McConnell, The Right To Die and the Jurisprudence of 
Tradition, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 665, 670–72, 686 (supporting the traditionalist 
approach to adjudication of unenumerated rights and arguing that “[a] juris-
prudence grounded in text and tradition is not hostile to social change, but it 
assigns the responsibility to determine the pace and direction of change to 
representative bodies”). Critics sometimes argue that unenumerated rights 
invite judges to substitute their own personal values for those of the Constitu-
tion. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 263, at 89. But see Ronald Dworkin, 
Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should Be Overruled, 59 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 381, 381, 390 (1992) (noting that the distinction between enumerated 
and unenumerated rights is “bogus” and “makes no sense, because it confuses 
reference with interpretation”); see also David Alan Slansky, Two More Ways 
Not To Think About Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, CHI. L. REV. (forth-
coming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
2474936 (challenging the idea in the Fourth Amendment context “that any 
protections needed against government infringements of privacy in the Infor-
mation Age are best developed outside of the courts and outside of constitu-
tional law”). 
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lege against self-incrimination—a right that inheres only in a 
natural person’s individual capacity.265  
Thinking beyond predictions, however, such a categorical 
denial of the right to corporations is not a foregone conclusion, 
nor should it be. As this Article’s analysis suggests, corpora-
tions seldom have a claim to a constitutional right to privacy, 
and so corporations as a broad category should not be accorded 
a right to privacy. A categorical denial, however, would fore-
close the possibility for organizations that support values pro-
tected by privacy to receive protection as new situations arise 
and as the right to privacy evolves. 
As explained in Part I.A., Morton Salt, decided in 1950, 
predated the Court’s modern privacy jurisprudence and did not 
make a broad ruling on the issue. Further, an aspect of the 
Court’s privacy jurisprudence is interpersonal, suggesting a 
foundation for recognizing a corporation as holding the right to 
protect individuals involved. Specifically, in Griswold v. Con-
necticut, the Court framed the issue of the validity of the state 
law forbidding use of contraceptives as about the “intimate re-
lation of husband and wife and their physician’s role in one as-
pect of that relation.”266 The Court notably did not focus the pri-
vacy protection on the individual, but rather on the “marriage 
relationship.”267 The Griswold Court also referenced other areas 
supporting group autonomy such as NAACP v. Alabama and 
the “freedom to associate and privacy in one’s associations.”268 
And the Court mentioned Sweezy v. New Hampshire, in which 
it stressed “the freedom of the entire university community” in 
reversing the contempt conviction of a professor who refused to 
respond to questions during an investigation into subversive 
activities.269 The Court included these examples to illustrate the 
existence of “penumbras” of the guarantees in the Bill of Rights 
 
 265. See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778–79 n.14 
(1978) (“Corporate identity has been determinative in several decisions deny-
ing corporations certain constitutional rights, such as the privilege against 
compulsory self-incrimination, [and] equality with individuals in the enjoy-
ment of a right to privacy . . . .” (citations omitted)); see also Hale v. Henkel, 
201 U.S. 43, 74–75 (1906) (categorically denying corporations the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination). 
 266. 381 U.S. at 482. 
 267. Id. at 486. 
 268. Id. at 483 (citing NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 
462 (1958)). 
 269. Id. at 482 (discussing Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 249–
50, 261–63 (1957)). 
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that “help give them life and substance.”270 For our purposes, 
these examples suggest an understanding that protecting a 
group or association—or corporation—can support an individu-
al’s freedom and privacy in some limited instances.271 It also 
raises the specter that while denying corporations the right to 
privacy would be the correct result in most circumstances, it 
could undercut the association jurisprudence. 
Further, as problems of information privacy have become 
increasingly urgent, scholars are beginning to explore how pri-
vacy has a social impact and how individuals can no longer ef-
fectively manage their privacy at the individual level through 
notification and consent.272 The argument for rethinking the 
third party doctrine and the relationship between consumers 
and corporations also underscores the idea raised above that 
corporations may serve as a useful check on the government.273  
As for the implications of the corporate form on the expec-
tation of privacy, the debate about whether the corporation is 
by nature public or private has raged for over a century and 
there is no sign of it being settled.274 Corporations have both 
public and private dimensions.275 Some theorists would draw 
 
 270. Id. at 484. 
 271. See Patterson, 357 U.S. at 459 (“The Association . . . is but the medium 
through which its individual members seek to make more effective the expres-
sion of their own views.”); see also Hills, supra note 19, at 187–88 (discussing 
how organizations advance individual autonomy). 
 272. See Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the 
Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1881–82 (2013) (noting privacy 
“fosters a certain kind of society, since people’s decisions about their own pri-
vacy affect society, not just themselves”); see also Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy 
Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1918–27 (2013) (arguing that innovation de-
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the line between public and private much closer to one side or 
the other. And, as one commentator noted, “[t]he line is drawn 
differently in different times and different places.”276 What is 
important for the rights analysis at hand is the observation 
that the public/private distinction is not automatic. It varies by 
context and observer. This suggests that the public dimensions 
of the corporate form would not automatically foreclose a right 
to privacy, though it could lessen such an expectation and the 
separate legal identity of the corporation should not be forgot-
ten. 
  CONCLUSION   
The debate over the notoriously nebulous and controversial 
constitutional right to privacy has left largely unexamined 
whether that right applies to one of the key actors in society—
corporations. This Article takes up that question, first identify-
ing and critically examining the growing and discordant case 
law on the issue and then analyzing whether the purpose of the 
privacy right would be served by according corporations that 
right.  
This analysis illuminates why most corporations should 
not have a constitutional right to privacy. Simply put, in most 
circumstances according the right would not serve its purpose 
because people are not involved in a way that warrants that 
protection. To grant corporations a right to privacy where no 
one’s constitutional privacy interests would be served by doing 
so would not only be misguided, it would further muddle and 
undercut the already confused area of corporate rights. This 
Article’s analysis also shows, however, that a categorical denial 
may also be unwise in our world of wide-ranging corporations, 
particularly given the evolving and indeterminate concept of 
privacy we have. Certain corporations reflect an associational 
dynamic, with tightly connected individuals pursuing activity, 
social, political, or religious in nature, that has long been val-
ued in fostering our societal goals of liberty and democracy. 
 
 
 276. Wolfe, supra note 274, at 1683. 
